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Crimes
Forfeiture of Computer Equipment: Preventing Computer
Criminals from Getting Back to Work
Stephen T. Bang
Code Sections Affected
Penal Code §§ 480, 502, 502.01 (amended).
AB 451 (Maddox); 1999 STAT. Ch. 254
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, computers can play any of three types of roles where crime is
concerned, as (1) the subject of the crime,' (2) the object of the crime,2 and (3) the
instrument used to commit the crime.3 Crimes such as theft, fraud, embezzlement
and trespass are all typical crimes which can be committed using computers as an
instrument.4 Although most of today's press coverage on computer crimes only
focuses on teenaged "hackers," other types of computer crimes, less publicized than
the crime of "hacking,"may be far more damaging to the nation.5 So-called "street
criminals" and white-collar criminals are learning the value of using computers to
commit their crimes more efficiently.6 In addition, organized crime rings are also
using computers to aid their counterfeit operations, 7 and a real fear exists that
counterfeit currency may help such criminals obtain the means to buy or create
1. See Xan Raskin & Jeannie Schaldach-Paiva, Eleventh Survey of White Collar Crime, 33 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 541,543 (1996) (explaining that computers are the subject of a crime when the computer is the physical
site of the crime, such as when the computer is infected with a virus).
2. See id. (noting that computers are the object of a crime when they are targeted for theft).
3. lId
4. Id.
5. See id. at 542 (stating that some experts believe crimes committed by criminals, such as disgruntled
or greedy employees, cause far more damage than teenage hackers).
6. See Glenn D. Baker, Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted: Computer Crime in the 1990s, 12 COMPUTER
L.J. 61, 62 (1993) (explaining that people other than "computer geeks"are now using computers to commit crimes,
and that street criminals and white-collar criminals are using computers as their "weapon of choice").
7. Act Aims to Curb Comicts' Counterfeiting, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 20, 1999, at B07; see id
(noting that Chapter 254 is intended to prevent criminals from regaining access to computers and software used
in their counterfeiting operations).
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chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.8 Clearly, computer crimes and
counterfeiting pose a serious threat to national-security.9
Counterfeiting U.S. currency is a serious problem which has detrimental effects
to the U.S. economy worldwide.1t Computer technology and reprographics" have
advanced so quickly in recent years that highly affordable computer equipment now
can make counterfeiting U.S. currency easier and cheaper.t2 Estimates show that
approximately $500 billion in counterfeit U.S. currency is being laundered
worldwide.13 At least a portion of this money eventually funds terrorism, drug
operations and weapons sales.14 Moreover, the value and negotiability of the
American dollar in other parts of the world have been injured due to a decline in
trust regarding the authenticity of U.S. currency.'5 In fact, counterfeiting is so much
of a problem in areas such as the Middle East that U.S. currency is worth less than
face value.'
6
Chapter 254 seeks to enhance the ability of law enforcement officials to force
the forfeiture of equipment used by computer criminals.' 7 The new law prevents
criminals from regaining access to their equipment, 8 closes a loophole which had
allowed employees to be immune from prosecution,' 9 allows for redistribution of
computer equipment,20 and expands the applicable list of crimes where computer
8. See id. (quoting the primary author of Chapter 254, Assemblymember Ken Maddox, stating that
"[counterfeiting] is becoming big business for street gangs" and noting that Chapter 254 is intended to prevent
criminals from regaining access to computers and software used in their counterfeiting operations); see also
Nathan K. Cummings, The Counterfeit Buck Slops Here: National Security Issues in the Redesign of U.S.
Currency, 8 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L. J. 539,549 (1999) (observing the view of some experts that counterfeit currency
and proceeds derived from counterfeit currency could fall into the hands of organized crime and pose a danger
to worldwids stability).
9. See generally Cummings, supra note 8, at 547-49 (examining the dangers counterfeiting poses to the
value of U.S. currency, which may be devalued by the use of proceeds generated from counterfeiting).
10. Id. at 549.
11. Reprographics refers to the process of reproducing, reprinting or copying by mechanical, photographic




15. See id. at 548 (noting that U.S. currency is accepted worldwide, yet many doubt the authenticity of the
currency and either are unwilling to accept it at all, or require additional compensation to accept it).
16. Id.
17. SENATECOMMITrEEONPUBLICSAFErY, COMMrFEEANALYStSOFAB 451, at 3 (June 22, 1999).
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.01(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 254) (expanding the list of crimes for
which equipment is subject to forfeiture).
19. See id. § 502(h)(1)-(2) (amended by Chapter 254) (creating an exemption so that employees will not
be held liable when they act within the new definition for scope of employment).
20. See id § 480(b) (amended by Chapter 254) (providing that counterfeiting equipment and computers
must be "disposed of pursuant to Section 502.01" so that the equipment is forfeited and redistributed instead of
being destroyed).
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equipment may be forfeited if used in the commission of a crime enumerated by the
new law.2'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A Deficiency in the List of Crimes Subject to Forfeiture
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 254, several shortcomings existed in
California's Penal Code provisions governing computer crimes.' The provisions
in the Penal Code that prevent convicted computer criminals from regaining access
to their computers and software are inadequate and ineffective by themselves,'
because they allowed the same computer equipment and software that criminals had
used to commit their crimes to ultimately be returned to them after their release
from incarceration.24 Moreover, only a limited list of computer crimes had been
subject to the forfeiture provisions of the former version of Penal Code section
502.01.2 Because only individuals convicted of: (1) gaining unauthorized access
to computers, computer systems and computer data;26 (2) obtaining telephone or
telegraph services by fraud;27 or (3) advertising, using or possessing
telecommunication devices with the intent to avoid paymenf28 were required to
forfeit the equipment used in the commission of these crimes, 29 criminals charged
with crimes other than these found themselves outside the scope of the statutory
language, and were entitled to regain possession of their confiscated computer
equipment and software after their release from incarceration.30
For example, in People v. Lamonte,3' the defendant requested the return of the
equipment seized during his arrest, including telephone equipment, computer
hardware and software which he admittedly used to alter credit cards and commit
21. Compare 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 555, sec. 1, at 3093 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.01)
(enumerating forfeiture to include property used in the commission of a crime in violation of either Penal Code
sections 502(c), 502.7 or 502.8), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.01(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 254) (expanding
forfeiture to include property used in the commission of a crime under Penal Code sections 470, 470a, 472, 476,
480, 484e(b), 484e(d), 484f(a), 484i(b), 502(c), 502.7, 502.8,529, 529a or 530.5).
22. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text (elucidating the deficiencies in the law prior to the
enactment of Chapter 254).
23. ASSEMBLYCOMMrITEEONPUBLICSAFErY,COMMITIEEANALYSISOFAB 451, at5 (Mar. 24, 1999);
see also Act Aims to Curb Convicts' Counterfeiting, supra note 7, at B07 (discussing the criminal's ability to
regain possession of counterfeiting computer equipment after being released from incarceration).
24. Act Aims to Curb Convicts' Counterfeiting, supra note 7, at B07.
25. Supra note 21.
26. 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 863, sec. 3, at 4435 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 502).
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.7 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
28. 1d § 502.8 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
29. 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 555, sec. 1, at 3093 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.01).
30. Id.
31. 53 Cal. App. 4th 544, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (1997).
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fraud.32 The court granted the return of all property belonging to Lamonte, because
"the [computer] equipment itself is not illegal to possess., 33 This loophole in the
law allowed computer criminals to continue their criminal activity immediately
after being released from incarceration.'
B. The Scope of Employment Loophole
Prior to Chapter 254's passage, employees who committed computer crimes
against their employers were immune from prosecution due to the ambiguous
language of the former version of Penal Code section 502(h).3 5 Although the prior
law created an exemption for employees who were acting within the scope of their
employment when violating Penal Code section 502(c), the phrase "scope of his or
her lawful employment" was never explicitly defined in the Penal Code. 6 As a
result, courts were forced to rely on the definition of "scope of employment" used
in tort law. 37 The "scope of employment" inquiry in tort law serves a wholly
different purpose than that in criminal law by allowing for monetary compensation
to the injured victim from the employer under principles of vicarious liability.
31
Thus, under the tort law definition of "scope of employment,'".[t]ortious conduct
that violates an employee's official duties or disregards the employer's express
orders may nonetheless be within the scope of employment., 39 Therefore, the tort
definition of scope of employment has been broadly construed, deriving from the
doctrine of respondeat superior.' Even when courts have applied the definition of
scope of employment within the context of tort law, they have struggled with the
32. Id. at 547-48, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812-13.
33. Id. at 553, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816.
34. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (shedding light on the criminal's ability to continue criminal
activity with the same equipment).
35. See ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITIEE ANALYSIS OF AB 451, at 6 (Mar. 24,
1999) (stating that, under prior law, employees who maliciously destroyed their employers' data were immune
from prosecution due to the lack of a definition for "scope of employment").
36. See 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 863, see. 3, at 4436 (amending CAL PENAL CODE § 502) (providing no
definition for this phrase).
37. Letter from Alberto Roldan, Deputy District Attorney, Sacramento County District Attorney's Office,
to Steven Meinrath, Legislative Advocate, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice (Mar. 26, 1999) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter Roldan]; see also Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202,
209, 814 P.2d 1341, 1344, 285 Cal. Rptr. 99, 102 (1991) (holding that, for purposes of tort law, an activity occurs
within an employee's "scope ofemployment" "when[,] in the context of the particular enterprire[,] an employee's
conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other
costs of the employer's business").
38. Mary M., 54 Cal. 3d at 209, 815 P.2d at 1343, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 101 (articulating that one of the
rationales for applying respondeat superior is "to ensure that the victim's losses will be equitably borne by those
who benefit from the enterprises that give rise to the injury').
39. Id. at 209,814 P.2d at 1344,285 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
40. See Farmer's Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992, 1004-05, 906 P.2d 440,448-49,
47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 478, 486-87 (1995) (citing the many cases that have found "scope of employment" to include
personal acts committed while in the employer's employment).
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multiple broad definitions cited in case law.4' For example, under one
interpretation, public entities and employers are not liable for their employees'
actions when the employees commit tortious acts due to their own personal
malice.42 The underlying justification courts have used in drawing these conclusions
is based on the fairness of imposing monetary damages upon employers as a "cost
of doing business." 3 Therefore, courts establish whether an employee's conduct
was within the scope of employment by using a test of foreseeability, which is
supposed to measure the fairness of holding an employer liable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior."
However, the exception in the former version of Penal Code section 502(h)(1)
had freed employees from criminal liability for their use of computer services if
they were acting within the scope of their employment in causing the computer-
induced damage.45 If the employee acted outside the scope of employment when the
damage was caused, and either (1) no injury was caused to any person or the
employer, or (2) the total value of the supplies or computer services used was less
than $100, then the employee would escape criminal liability.
46
C. Counterfeiting
Computer equipment used in counterfeiting was previously required to be
destroyed instead of being redistributed for legitimate purposes."7 California's
counterfeiting law previously provided for the physical destruction of all machines
and materials intended to be used for counterfeiting. 48 Although computers were not
specifically addressed in Penal Code section 480, the statutory language was broad
enough to encompass the physical destruction of computer equipment as well.49
However, computers have become an increasingly prevalent instrument in the world
of counterfeit-dollar production.50 Home computer systems equipped with high-
quality scanners and ink-jet printers are now capable of producing such high-quality
counterfeits that expensive counterfeiting machines are not necessary, and indeed
41. Id. at 1004-05,906 P.2d at 448-49,47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486-87.
42. See id. at 1004,906 P.2d at 448,47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486.
43. See, e.g., i at 1004, 906 P.2d at 448,47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486 (finding fairness in the imposition of tort
liability on an employer for employees acting within the scope of their employment).
44. Id. at 1004,906 P.2d at 448,47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486.
45. 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 863, sec. 3, at 4436 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 502).
46. Idi
47. See 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 165, sec, 6, at 642 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 480) (requiring the physical
destruction of computer equipment that had been used in crimes).
48. Id
49. Id.
50. See J. Taylor Buckley & Tony Boylan, New $20 Bill Key Weapon in War on Counterfeiting, USA
TODAY, Apr. 9. 1998, at A01 (describing the trend of counterfeiters using computer scanners and ink-jet printers
rather than counterfeit machines).
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are rarely used by criminals today.51 As a result, the use of computers in
counterfeiting operations has increased at such a high rate that from 1995 to 1997,
the amount of counterfeit currency produced by computer ink-jet printers increased
by 3400%.52 Traditional counterfeiting machines 53 served only one, illegitimate
purpose, and were destroyed upon capture to prevent the materials and machinery
from being used again.' However, because computer equipment has numerous
legitimate applications, physical destruction is a wasteful and infeasible remedy.
II. CHAPTER 254
A. New Crimes Subject to Forfeiture
Chapter 254 expands the list of crimes that can cause a person to forfeit the
tools used to commit his or her crime. The new law updates the list of crimes
subject to forfeiture, making forfeiture applicable to a comprehensive list of crimes,
including: general forgery;55 forgery of a driver's license or identification card;
5 6
forgery or counterfeiting of documentary seals;
57 money counterfeiting; 58
possession or making of counterfeiting equipment;59 forgery of bills, notes and
checks; acquiring four or more access cards within 12 months which he or she
knows or has reason to know were acquired illegally;' acquiring or possessing
access card information with the intent to defraud; 61 making or altering access
cards; 62 false impersonation of another in her private or official capacity; 63 and
unauthorized use of personal identification information to obtain credit, goods,
services or medical information in the name of another person.6
When minors use computer equipment owned by their parents to commit any
one of the newly applicable crimes listed in Penal Code section 502.01(a)(1),
existing provisions serve to create a method by which parents may prevent the
forfeiture of their equipment. 65 A minor's parents may avoid forfeiture of their
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Cummings, supra note 8, at 550 (describing the key piece of expensive machinery that
counterfeiters were required to use prior to the proliferation of computers-an intaglio press-which operates by
using special ink and forcing this ink onto the paper).
54. Roldan, supra note 37.
55. CAL PENAL CODE § 470 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
56. Id. § 470(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
57. Id. § 472 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
58. Id. § 476 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
59. Id. § 480(a) (amended by Chapter 254).
60. Id. § 484e(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
61. Id. § 484e(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
62. Id. § 484i(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
63. Id. § 529 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
64. Id. § 530.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
65. Id. § 502.01(e) (amended by Chapter 254).
258
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computer equipment if they sign a statement and submit it to the court, guaranteeing
that the minor will not have access to the computer at any time in the two years
after the date on which the minor is sentenced.6 However, if the minor commits
another crime enumerated by Penal Code section 502.01(a)(1), the original property
subject to forfeiture from the first crime and the property used to commit the second
crime will both be forfeited. 7 Parents then have one last opportunity to protect their
property from forfeiture-to avoid forfeiture, they must pay full restitution to the
victims of the minor's offenses if the property used in the commission of the crime
was located in the minor's primary residence during the criminal act.6
As an additional safeguard against unnecessary forfeiture, Chapter 254 grants
courts discretion where either an adult or a minor defendant "is not likely to use the
property otherwise subject to forfeiture for future illegal acts." 69 Because most
computer crimes do not involve violence, a defendant would most likely receive
probation and lose access to his or her computer during this probationary period as
punishment.70 By giving courts discretion in deciding whether to grant a
prosecutor's request for forfeiture, Chapter 254 avoids the imposition of an
additional penalty that would be too harsh.
As an exception to the forfeiture provisions, criminals who are prosecuted for
an infraction under Penal Code section 502 will not be required to forfeit their
computer equipment.7 ' Had Chapter 254 allowed for the forfeiture of computer
equipment used to commit crimes, then it would have dramatically overstepped the
boundaries of proportionate punishment. The maximum penalty for infractions of
this sort is a fine of no greater than $250 for first-time offenders.72 The cost of
computer equipment can be as much as ten times that amount, so the forfeiture of
such technology would result in a disproportionate punishment.73
B. Crimes Committed During the Scope of Employment
The phrase "scope of employment" as used in Penal Code section 502(h)(1) is
now explicitly defined to include "acts which are reasonably necessary to the
performance of [the actor's] work assignment." 74 This is a significantly narrower
66. Id. § 502.01(e)(2) (amended by Chapter 254).
67. Id. § 502.01(e)(3) (amended by Chapter 254).
68. Id. § 502.01(e)(4) (amended by Chapter 254).
69. Id. § 502.01(f) (amended by Chapter 254).
70. SENATE COMMMEE ON PUBLIC SAFE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 451, at 12 (June22, 1999).
71. Id. § 502.01(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 254).
72. Id. § 502 (d)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter 254); see id. (setting the punishment for a first-time violation
of Penal Code sections 502(c)(6), 502(c)(7) and 502(cX8) at a fine of $250 where no injury has occurred).
73. SENATECOMMITEEON PUBLCSAFErY,COMMrrrEEANALYSIS OFAB 451, at 11 (June 22, 1999).
74. CAL PENAL CODE § 502(h)(1) (amended by Chapter 254).
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definition than the broad and ambiguous tort definition of "scope of employment."
75
The prior law potentially could have allowed employees to maliciously delete
critical data from an employer's computer systems if their employment involved
modifying or deleting files from a computer.76 Although this criminal activity
previously would have fallen within the definition of "scope of employment," the
new definition would not allow such an employee to escape criminal liability,
because maliciously deleting critical data cannot be characterized as a "reasonably
necessary" task.77
C. Redistributing Foifeited Computers and Computer Equipment
Computers and equipment used to counterfeit currency in violation of Penal
Code section 480 will no longer be physically destroyed.78 The new provisions
created by Chapter 254 specifically address computers by providing that computers,
computer systems and computer networks will be "disposed of" according to Penal
Code section 502.01, 79 which allows for a hierarchical method of redistribution. 0
According to the existing provisions in Penal Code section 502.01, the victim has
the first priority in receiving the forfeited property.8 1 If the victim chooses not to
accept the property, or the court elects to exercise its discretion, the property or
remaining funds may distributed to: "(1) the prosecuting agency;82 (2) the public
entity of which the prosecuting agency is a part;83 (3) the public entity whose
officers or employees conducted the investigation resulting in the forfeiture;84 (4)
other state and local public entities, including school districts; 85 (5) nonprofit
charitable organizations; 8 6 or (6) any combination of these entities.87
75. See supra Part II.B (pointing to the broadness and ambiguity of the previously applicable tort law
definition).
76. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMirEE ANALYSIS OF AB 451, at 9 (June 22, 1999)
(reciting Chapter 254's author's intent to prevent employees from escaping criminal liability for their malicious
acts against their employer where the employees are authorized to modify or delete files from a computer).
77. Id.
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 480(b)(1)-(2) (amended by Chapter 254).
79. Id.
80. Id. § 502.01(g) (amended by Chapter 254).
81. Id. § 502.01(g)(1) (amended by Chapter 254).
82. Id. § 502.01(g)(2)(A) (amended by Chapter 254).
83. Id. § 502.01(g)(2)(B) (amended by Chapter 254).
84. Id. § 502.01 (g)(2)(C) (amended by Chapter 254).
85. Id. § 502.01(g)(2)(D) (amended by Chapter 254).
86. Id. § 502.01(g)(2)(E) (amended by Chapter 254).
87. Id. § 502.01(g)(2) (amended by Chapter 254).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
A. Notorious Recidivists
The effectiveness of creating forfeiture provisions for computer-related crimes
is questionable. Some skeptics argue that forfeiture will only slightly inconvenience
computer criminals because such criminals may be able to continue their illicit
activities by simply purchasing new computers."8 Computer criminals are known
to be "notorious recidivists," and, unfortunately, forfeiture of their equipment may
achieve little in deterring criminals who are determined to break the law again.89
While one of the asserted effects of providing for forfeiture upon conviction is
that it prevents crime, the penalty might not be effective in accomplishing this goal.
Computer equipment has become so inexpensive that criminals will have little
difficulty in purchasing newer and more sophisticated equipment. 90 Using forfeiture
as a method of deterrence assumes that criminals will not have adequate resources
or funds to purchase new computer equipment. Currently, $500 billion in
counterfeit currency is being circulated worldwide, and as a result, organized crime
groups have access to large amounts of counterfeit currency and proceeds generated
from their money laundering operations.9 Therefore, the overall effect of using
forfeiture as a method of deterrence ignores the financial capabilities of computer
criminals. However, Penal Code section 502 does impose increasingly stiffer
penalties for each subsequent violation.92 Consequently, fines and jail time may be
a more effective method of deterrence than forfeiture.
B. Computer Criminals and the Tendency to Rationalize
Stopping computer criminals from perpetrating their crimes will remain
difficult for another reason. Their propensities to repeatedly commit computer
crimes often is based on their underlying belief that they are not doing any harm.93
Computer criminals rationalize their criminal behavior by claiming that the use of
88. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFEry, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 451, at 12 (June 22, 1999).
89. See i. (reaffirming the view that computer criminals are notorious recidivists, and arguing that they
may only be inconvenienced by forfeiture).
90. See Cummings, supra note 8, at 547-49 (emphasizing that the cost of computer systems has directly
brought the cost of counterfeiting operations down).
91. Id. at 549.
92. See CAL PENAL CODE § 502(d)(2)(B) (amended by Chapter 254) (increasing the possible punishment
for subsequent violations of Penal Code section 502(c)(3) so that a maximum fine of $10,000 or three years in
prison may be imposed); see also id. § 502(d)(4)(B) (creating an increased penalty of up to $5,000, one year in
jail, or both a fine and imprisonment for subsequent violations of Penal Code section 502(c)(9), or where the
violation results in an injury).
93. See DONN B. PARKER, FIGHTING COMPUTER CRIME 180-82 (1983) (analyzing the rationale used by a
notorious computer criminal who commits telephone fraud and other computer-related crimes).
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idle services 94 does not create any additional expenditure or injure the consumer."
The illegal use or transmission of data and electricity through a telephone line
purportedly requires no additional expenditure because the "circuit already has a
flow of electricity through it."9 According to an unwritten "code of ethics"
supposedly followed by "phreaks" 97 and hackers, delaying or denying service to
consumers is strictly forbidden.98
Another reason that computer criminals further justify their actions is that many
of them "suffer" from what is known as the "Robin Hood Syndrome."99 Criminals
who have this mentality believe that inflicting harm upon an individual is immoral,
yet harming organizations, companies and computers is acceptable behavior.1' °
Attacking these entities is not only seen as harmless, but is also considered a heroic
act which helps solve security flaws in computer systems. 1' Regardless of the truth
or falsity of these assertions and assumptions, computer criminals truly believe their
conduct is not harmful, and generally do not think twice about breaking the law
again.
10 2
C. The Potential Danger to Employers
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice (CACJ) raises the argument that the
forfeiture provisions of Chapter 254 do not prevent crime.0 3 Because computer
equipment may be used for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes, CACJ is
concerned that the forfeiture of computer systems could result in employers losing
their computer equipment due to the criminal acts of their employees.""4 Businesses
that are heavily reliant upon computer systems can suffer dire consequences upon
such forfeiture, and their ability to conduct business could become crippled.0 5
94. Idle services consist of telephone and computer services for which incremental use does not require
any additional resources or expenditures. Id. at 180.
95. See id. at 180-81 (explaining the argument that a few additional users make no significant difference
in response time or costs).
96. Id. at 180.
97. A "phone phreak" is an individual who engages in telephone fraud. Id. at 171.
98. See id. at 181 (reciting the claim of "Cap'n Crunch," a notorious phreak, that he and his associates
abide by this ethical code while engaging in their criminal activities).
99. Id. at 181-82; see id. (explaining that computer criminals believe harming individuals is wrong but
harming organizations is, in some circumstances, acceptable behavior).
100. Id.
101. See id. (reciting the claim by hackers and phreaks that their illicit criminal activity actually benefits
consumers and companies by identifying security issues).
102. See generally id. at 170-82 (reporting the multiple arrests of Cap'n Crunch and his views on why he
believes his criminal activity benefits companies and consumers).
103. Letter from Steven Meinrath, Legislative Advocate, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, to Ken
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However, these critics ignore the fact that Penal Code section 502.01 has
several safeguards in place which ensure that computer equipment will not be
wrongfully forfeited.'0 6 Under existing law, a party who has an interest in the
forfeited equipment has several opportunities to regain possession of the
property.1 07 Before a hearing is held to determine whether the property in question
should be forfeited, an investigation is held to give notice to persons who may have
an interest in the property.t 8 Interest holders may then file a motion for redemption
to declare their interest in the property.' 9 As long as the State cannot show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the interest holder knew or should have known
the property was being used to commit the crime, or that the interest holder failed
to take reasonable steps to prevent the use of the property to commit the crime, then
the sentencing court may grant the interest holder possession of the property."0
Furthermore, the State still has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that property used by the criminal is subject to forfeiture."'
V. CONCLUSION/
Almost every possible crime a computer can be used to commit is now included
in the provisions of Chapter 254 so that when an individual engages in any one of
the listed criminal activities, the computer equipment used in the commission of the
crime will be forfeited.1 2 The list of crimes subject to forfeiture may now be more
complete, but whether and to what extent it will help deter criminals is uncertain at
best."' Nevertheless, while computer criminals are known to be "some of the worst
recidivists,""14 if forfeiture will not deter criminals, it at least might hinder their
illegal activities."
5
Ironically, victims of the computer-related crimes might not be the parties most
benefitted by Chapter 254; perhaps the parties who will gain the most from the new
law will be employers, as the new law specifically exempts them from its "scope
of employment" definition so that when their employees use the employers'
computer equipment to commit their crimes, the employers themselves will not
have to forfeit their equipment, so long as they neither knew nor should have known
106. See CAL PENAL CODE § 502.01(c) (amended by Chapter 254) (creating a remedy for parties who have
an interest in the equipment subject to forfeiture by allowing the parties to file a motion for redemption).
107. 1l § 502.01(b)-(e) (amended by Chapter 254).
108. Id. § 502.0 1(c) (amended by Chapter 254).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id § 502.01(b) (amended by Chapter 254).
112. 1&. § 502.01(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 254); see supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text (defining
the expanded list of crimes for which property is now subject to forfeiture).
113. See supra Part 1V.B (explaining thejustification computer criminals use to repeatedly commit crimes).
114. SENATE COMMrrTEE ON PtBLC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSiS OFAB 451, at 8 (June 22, 1999).
115. Id.
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of the illegal operations in question.11 6 At the same time, however, employees who
commit computer crimes may no longer escape criminal liability by hiding under
the formerly ambiguous "scope of the employment" exception.n 7 Prior to Chapter
254, employees whose employment allowed the use of an employer's computer
equipment for data modification could be found to fall within the "scope of
employment" exception despite the criminal intentions of the employee. 18
Chapter 254 also addresses the counterfeiting dilemma, and seeks to deter
computer criminals by amending Penal Code sections 480, 502, and 502.01." 9 By
preventing criminals from regaining access to their equipment, closing a loophole
which had allowed employees to be immune from prosecution, allowing for the
redistribution of computer equipment, and enumerating a more thorough list of
computer crimes for which owners may be subject to forfeiture, the amended
statutes now provide a more thorough and useful method of deterring computer
criminals.'20
116. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining that employers can rest assured that, so long as
they had no occasion to know that their employees were using company equipment to commit their computer
crimes, then the equipment will not be subject to forfeiture).
117. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (defining the phrase "scope of employment" to
distinguish it from the broad tort definition).
118. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (recounting the narrow situation where cmployees could have
exploited a loophole in the prior law to escape criminal liability).
119. See supra Part I (explaining the goal of the State Legislature to hinder the criminal endeavors of
counterfeiters who use computers and to deter computer criminals by expanding the scope of the forfeiture
provisions in Chapter 254 for computer-related crimes).
120. Supra Part III.
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Penal Code §§ 12087, 12087.5, 12088, 12088.1, 12088.2, 12088.3,
12088.4, 12088.5, 12088.6, 12088.7, 12088.8, 12088.9 (new).
AB 106 (Scott); 1999 STAT. Ch. 246
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1992, the day California's new criminal-storage-of-a-firearm
law' went into effect, a 4-year-old boy unintentionally shot and killed himself with
a gun only moments after his grandfather had used it to celebrate New Year's Eve.'
After learning that the grandfather usually kept the firearm locked away in a
cabinet, a judge reduced the felony charge against the grandfather to a
misdemeanor.3 Eventually, the grandfather was sentenced to probation and
subsequently was ordered to launch a public awareness campaign regarding the
dangers of firearms.4
This unfortunate tale is one of many which demonstrates the reluctance by
prosecutors to fully punish family members when their negligent storage of a
firearm causes injury to a loved one. Although the purpose of creating a punishment
for negligently storing a firearm is to promote safety,5 far more is required to
remedy the current epidemic of firearms-related injuries and fatalities.
Startling figures reported in firearms safety studies show dangers posed by
firearms are a source of great concern among Americans. Since 1972, more than
30,000 people per year have died from gunshot wounds, making gunshot wounds
the second leading cause of death in the United States.6 Furthermore, more than
1,000 Americans are injured or killed unintentionally by firearms every year.7
1. CAL PENAL CODE § 12035 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000).




6. Charles Marwick, HELP Network Says Firearms Data Gap Makes Reducing Gun Injuries More
Difflcult, 281 JAMA 784,784 (1999).
7. Nancy Sinauer et al., Unintentional, Nonfatal Fireann.Related Injuries: A Preventable Public Health
Burden, 275 JAMA 1740,1740 (1996).
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Between 1986 and 1996 alone, as many as 1,500 people per year were killed by
such unintentional gunshot wounds.8 Even more disturbingly, eighteen percent of
those victims suffering an unintentional fatal gunshot wound in 1988 were under
the age of fifteen.9
While a variety of activities can result in the unintentional infliction of gunshot
wounds,'0 at least one study shows that cleaning a gun is the most common such
activity.1 Hunting and playing with a firearm were reported as the second and third
most common such activities, respectively.'2 Still, a large percentage of
unintentional shootings were characterized as having been caused by "other"
activities, including carrying, showing, and looking at a firearm.'3
In a survey of police officers on firearms safety, seventy-nine percent of police
officers recommended the use of either a trigger lock or a lockbox for firearms
stored at home.'4 Furthermore, fifty-nine percent of police officers listed trigger
locks as their preferred method for preventing unintentional firearms accidents at
home.15 Police officers are not alone in their views; seventy-four percent of the
public supports safety regulation of the firearms industry.' 6 However, firearms
consumers are apparently interested in finding types of child safety devices for their
firearms which will still afford them immediate access to the gun when necessary.
1 7
In an attempt to reduce the tragic accidents resulting from negligent firearms
storage and handling, Chapter 246 creates standards for firearms safety devices, 18
requires devices sold or manufactured in California to meet these standards, 19
mandates that safety devices be included with all firearms sold in the State,20 and
requires warning labels to be affixed to all firearms sold or transferred in
California.2'
8. d.
9. Accidental Shootings: Data on Children, General Accounting Office Reports and Testimony, available
in 1991 WL 2659317.
10. Id.
11. See Sinauer, supra note 7, at 1742-43 (identifying the most common activities reported by victims of
non-fatal, unintentional gunshot wounds as: (1) cleaning a gun, at 13.7%; (2) hunting-related activities, at 12.3%;
and (3) playing with a firearm, at 7.7%).
12. Id.
13. See id. (categorizing responses that were too few to report separately as "other" and finding that "other"
shootings accounted for 23.9% of the shootings reported).
14. Donna M. Denno et al., Safe Storage of Handguns: What Do the Police Recommend?, 150 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRiCS ADOLESCENT MED. 927,927-31 (1996).
15. Id.
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12087.5(h) (enacted by Chapter 246) (citing the results of a public opinion
poll conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago).
17. See Mark D. Polston & Douglas S. Weil, Unsafe by Design: Using Tort Actions to Reduce Firearm-
Related Injuries, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 14 (1997) (noting that "many people strongly... believe that they
need a readily available gun").
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12088.2 (enacted by Chapter 246).
19. Id. § 12088 (enacted by Chapter 246).
20. Id. § 12088.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
21. Id. § 12088.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 246).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. California's Strict Gun Control Laws
California has some of the most stringent gun control laws in the U.S.' All
sales, transfers, and loans of guns in the state must be conducted by a licensed gun
dealer.' Gun dealers must perform background checks on prospective gun owners,
obtain a basic firearms safety certificate, and offer to provide the purchaser with a
pamphlet explaining firearms laws.24 Moreover, persons interested in purchasing
a gun must wait ten days before gaining possession of the gun.25 Recent figures
indicate that these strict laws have proved to be moderately effective in preventing
criminals from attaining guls.2 6
In addition to the strict requirements California has in place for purchasing or
transferring guns, gun owners can be subject to criminal liability for the improper
storage of firearms.27 If a child under the age of sixteen uses a gun stored
improperly by the gun owner, the gun owner may be charged with criminal storage
of a firearm in the first degree if the child or any other person suffers great bodily
injury as a result of the improper storage.28 Those who are prosecuted for this
offense face up to three years in prison, up to $10,000 in fines, or both prison time
and fines.29 Where a child or any other person suffers injuries "other than great
bodily injury" as a result of a child gaining access to a firearm, 30 the gun owner
faces a comparatively lighter punishment of up to one year in jail, up to $1,000 in
fines, or both jail time and fines.3' Similarly, if a child under the age of sixteen
carries a firearm off the premises of any location where a firearm is stored, the gun
owner may be subjected to a lighter punishment of up to one year in jail, up to
22. Noah Isackson, U.S. Gun Laws Would Toughen State's Weapons: Some of California's Restrictions,
However[,) Are Stronger than the Proposed Federal Standards, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 22, 1999, at A4.
Even though the proposed federal legislation (H.R. 1512) would have imposed even tougher gun control
restrictions on California had it passed, the State Attorney General would have chosen to enforce the tougher set
of laws. Id.; see also Amy Chance, SACRAMENTO BEE, Gun Makers Under Siege: Poll Finds Increasing Support
for Controls, May 30, 1999, at Al (explaining that California has 675 state gun control laws now in effect, not
including regulations, ordinances, and federal laws).
23. CAL PENAL CODE § 1207(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 12072(c)(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000).
26. See, e.g., Isackson, supra note 22, at A4 (stating that over 3,000 applications for guns in California
were rejected in 1998 due to the criminal history of the applicants).
27. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (listing the various crimes for which gun owners may
be prosecuted where children gain access to a negligently stored firearm).
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12035(b)(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (imposing criminal liability upon a
firearms owner who improperly stores a firearm which a child under the age of sixteen is likely to access and
which in fact causes great bodily injury as a result of the negligent storage).
29. Id. § 12035(d)(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000).
30. Id. § 12035(b)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000).
31. Id. § 12036(d)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000).
2000 / Crimes
$1,000 in fines, or both jail time and fines. 2 However, these sources of criminal
liability have not proved to be very effective deterrents to improper firearms storage
because these laws are rarely enforced.33 This is so despite the legal requirement for
licensed gun dealers to conspicuously post a sign in their businesses warning
prospective gun owners of criminal liability for causing injury by negligently
storing their firearms.34
In response to demand for more effective deterrents, lawmakers have
introduced four firearms safety bills similar to Chapter 246 in the last ten years.3 5
Unfortunately, both Governor George Deukmejian and Governor Pete Wilson
vetoed these bills.36 In the meantime, several California counties and cities were
busy enacting their own local ordinances, which required gun dealers to provide
trigger locks on the sale of all new guns.37 By 1998, twenty-two California counties
and cities had already enacted local ordinances requiring gun dealers to provide
trigger locks on all new guns.38 By 1999, that figure had risen to a total of thirty
California counties and cities requiring mandatory trigger locks.
39
B. Why Trigger Locks Are Needed
Children have the ability to fire guns at very young ages.40 To pull the trigger
on an average handgun, the operator need only apply approximately ten pounds of
pressure to the trigger.41 A study on children's ability to fire guns determined that
some children as young as three years old could apply sufficient pressure to fire a
32. Id. § 12036(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000).
33. See Seligman, supra note 2, at Al (noting the reluctance of district attorneys to bring charges against
parents whose improper storage of a firearm results in the death of a child).
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12071(b)(7)(A)-(B) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000).
35. See SB 861 (1988) (as introduced on March 6, 1989, but not enacted); SB 134 (1993) (as introduced
on January 26, 1993, but not enacted); AB 1124 (1997) (as introduced on February 2, 1997, but not enacted); SB
1550 (1993) (as introduced on February 11, 1998, but not enacted).
36. See Mark Gladstone et al., Assembly OKs Bill to Require Trigger Locks, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at
Al (noting that trigger lock legislation had been attempted several times by the Legislature, but was always vetoed
by past governors).
37. See Ray Huard, New S.D. Law Requires Gun Trigger-Locks, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 18,1998,
at Al (stating that 22 California counties and cities, including Alameda County, Berkeley, Contra Costa County,
Daly City, Fremont, Hayward, Hercules, Lafayette, Livermore, Los Angeles, Oakland, Piedmont, Pleasanton,
Richmond, Sacramento, San Francisco, San Jose, San Leandro, San Mateo, San Mateo County, San Pablo, and
West Holl3wood have trigger lock ordinances in place).
38. Id.; see also Luis Monteagudo, Jr., Cluda Vista Approves TriggerLock Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRW.,
Feb. 18, 1999, at B2 (noting that San Diego, Escondido, Imperial Beach, National City, end Chula Vista have
similar laws in place which require gun dealers to provide trigger locks upon the sale of each handgun).
39. SENATECOMMrrrEEoNPUBLICSAFY, COMMrrEEANALYSiS oFSB 130, at7 (Apr. 6, 1999).
40. See Sara M. Naureckas et al., Children's and Women's Ability to Fire Handguns, 149 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRICS ADOLESCENT MED. 1318, 1320 (1995) (reporting the findings of a study which compared the ability
of children and their mothers to fire handguns).
41. Id.
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gun.42 These figures indicate that children can seriously injure or kill themselves or
others when they stumble upon negligently stored firearms.
When Connecticut enacted mandatory firearms safety laws without developing
a method of certifying locks,43 crafty manufacturers engineered "legality locks" or
"junk locks" solely designed to satisfy the statutory requirements for firearms safety
devices without being effective as true safety devices. 44 Such trigger locks are so
ineffective that the lock can easily be removed by a child, and the gun may still fire
with the trigger lock installed.45 An enforceable standard would prevent the use of
such "junk locks" as a method of foregoing the safety features of the lock.
46
C. Firearms Safety Technology
Technology to create safer guns that can reduce the number of unintentional
shootings has been in development for several years.47 Significant evidence shows
that measures to protect children from unintentional gunshot wounds have been
necessary since as far back as 1884, when Smith & Wesson developed the "lemon
squeezer" gun.48 The unique grip of the "lemon squeezer" gun required the gun to
be squeezed before the trigger could be pulled.49 This feature prevented children
with smaller and weaker hands from firing the gun due to their inability to perform
both actions at once.50
42. See id. (reporting that 25% of 3- and 4-year-olds, 75% of 5- to 6-year- olds, and 90% of 7- to 8-year-
olds could apply the 10 pounds of pressure required to fire a gun when using 2 fingers); see also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 12087.5(e) (enacted by Chapter 246) (finding legislatively that children have the ability to fire negligently
stored firearms).
43. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-33(c), 29-37b (West 1990 & Supp. 1999) (creating the requirement
that any "pistol or revolver" must be equipped with a "reusable trigger lock, gun'Iock or gun locking device
appropriate for such pistol or revolver, which lock or device shall be constructed of material sufficiently strong
to prevent it from being easily disabled").
44. See VPC Demonstrates How Weak Senate Bill Allows "Junk Locks," June 8, 1999, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
available in 1999 WL 4636699 (demonstrating the need for a statutory standard to counteract the manufacture
and use of ineffective gun locks which can be easily removed or bypassed).
45. See Marwick, supra note 6 (quoting Bruce Skane of the National Rifle Association); see also Paul M.
Barrett & Vanessa O'Connell, Pursuit of "Smart Gun" Leaves Famed Manufacturer Wounded: Colt's Attacked
by Rival Firearms Firms, Hit with Costly Boycott, SAN DiEGO UNioN-TRIB., May 23, 1998, at A29 (quoting Colt
executive Roland Stewart's statement that "most gun locks can be defeated by a 6-year-old with a screwdriver").
46. Marwick, supra note 6.
47. See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (describing the efforts by gun makers to produce guns
with safety features, including the Smith & Wesson lemon squeezer and the Colt Z-40).
48. See James T. Dixon, On Lemon Squeezers and Locking Devices: Consumer Product Safety and
Firearms, A Modest Proposal, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 979, 993 (1997) (stating that the idea of producing a




More recently, guns equipped with computer microchips, dubbed "smart guns,"
have been the subject of much debate. 5' The development and use of smart guns has
been hindered by the unwillingness of gun owners to support smart guns.52
However, Colt Manufacturing Company, Inc. (Colt) emerged as the sole gun
manufacturer willing to take advantage of a federal grant to research safer gun
technology in smart guns. 53 Colt developed the prototype Z-40 smart gun, which
utilized a wristband to emit coded radio signals for owners to operate their smart
guns.54 When gun owners received word of Colt's invention, a massive boycott
resulted, crippling Colt's sales.55 Gun advocates feared that the development of
smart guns could lead to a ban of traditional guns not equipped with technologically
advanced safety mechanisms such as Colt's. 56 Although technology may be readily
available to help curb the number of unintentional shootings, strong opposition
from pro-gun organizations such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) has
effectively prevented smart guns from being widely recognized as a safety design
alternative.57
I. CHAPTER 246
A. Establishing Minimum Standards for Firearms Safety Devices
Chapter 246 requires the California Department of Justice (DOJ) to develop
minimum safety standards for firearms safety devices and gun safes" and to report
these final regulations to the California Legislature by January 1, 2001. 59 To
implement these standards, the DOJ must certify laboratories that will test
prospective firearms safety devices"O for compliance with the legislative intent to
reduce the risk of firearms-related injuries inflicted upon children seventeen years
of age and younger.6' Based on these standards, the laboratories will test the
effectiveness of the devices and submit these findings to the DOJ. 62 The DOJ is then
51. See Barrett & O'Connell, supra note 45, at A29 (reporting that smart gun proponents believe guns
should be equipped with safety features that do not allow children to operate them while smart gun opponents
believe that if smart guns are built, guns that are not smart can eventually be banned).




55. d.; see also id. (recounting the organized effort of gun owners and gun dealers to boycott Colt's
prototype gun by distributing flyers, clogging Colt's phone lines, and discontinuing orders for Colt's products).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. CAL PENAL CODE § 12088.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
59. Id. § 12088.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 246).
60. Id. § 12088(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
61. Id. § 12088.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
62. Id. § 12088(c) (enacted by Chapter 246).
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required to compile a list of approved devices that passed laboratory testing and
compile, publish and maintain the list on or after July 1, 2001.63
After a list of approved firearms safety devices has been published by the DOJ,
Chapter 246 requires all firearms sold or transferred in California to include one of
the approved devices.64 However, purchasers of firearms who: (1) already own a
gun safe from which a firearm may not readily be removed;65 and (2) present proof
of ownership of such a gun safe, are not required to purchase a firearm with an
approved safety device.6 An additional exemption applies where the prospective
gun owner: (1) purchases an approved safety device no more than thirty days prior
to taking possession of the firearm;67 (2) presents the safety device to the firearms
dealer when picking up the firearm;( and (3) presents proof of purchase for the
safety device.69 The firearms dealer must verify that these criteria have been
satisfied,70 and the dealer must keep a copy of the receipt in his or her records.7'
Additional exemptions of Chapter 246 allow some current gun owners to be
wholly unaffected by the new law.72 For example, antique guns are exempt from the
requirements of the new law.73 In addition, peace officers will also be exempt
because their firearms are used in the course of their employment. 74
To ensure that firearms safety devices meet the DOJ's standards, the new law
also allows the DOJ to order the recall and replacement of nonconforming firearms
safety devices and gun safes, or, alternatively, to require that the offending devices
come into compliance with the standards listed at Penal Code sections 12088.1(a)75
or 12088.2(a).
76
63. Id. § 12088(d) (enacted by Chapter 246).
64. Id. § 12088.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
65. See iU. § 12088.1(c) (enacted by Chapter 246) (applying to gun purchasers whose gun safes already
comply with the requirements of the new Penal Code section 12088.2(a)(3), which mandates that such safes
adequately store firearms without being easily opened by unauthorized individuals).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 12088.1(d)(1) (enacted by Chapter 246).
68. Id. § 12088.1(d)(2) (enacted by Chapter 246).
69. Id. § 12088.1(d)(3) (enacted by Chapter 246).
70. Id. § 12088.1(d)(4) (enacted by Chapter 246).
71. Id. § 12088.1(d)(5) (enacted by Chapter 246).
72. Id. § 12088.1(c) (enacted by Chapter 246); id. § 12088.8 (enacted by Chapter 246).
73. Id. § 12088.8(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
74. Id. § 12088.8(b) (enacted by Chapter 246).
75. Id. § 12088.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 246) (requiring all firearms sold or transferred by licensed
firearms dealers to be accompanied by a firearms safety device).
76. Id. § 12088.4 (enacted by Chapter 246); id. § 12088.2(a) (mandating that the standards for firearms
safety devices address the risk of injury from unintentional gunshot wounds, address the risk of injury from self-




By January 1, 2002, all guns manufactured or sold in California must bear a
new warning label, the text of which is set forth in the new law." In both English
and Spanish, all labels must read:
WARNING
Children are attracted to and can operate firearms that can cause severe injuries
or death. Prevent child access by always keeping guns locked away and
unloaded when not in use. If you keep a loaded firearm where a child obtains
and improperly uses it, you may be fined or sent to prison. 8
If the firearm is contained within a package, the warning label must be affixed to
the outside of the package.79 Where there is no package, the warning label must be
affixed to the firearm itself.8
C. Tracking the Effectiveness of the New Law
To ensure that the new law is effective, Chapter 246 also imposes a duty upon
all law enforcement agencies to continually submit reports to the Department of
Health Services (DHS). 81 Any incident where an unintentional or self-inflicted
gunshot wound causes injury to a child under the age of eighteen, or where a child
is treated for medical attention or dies, must be reported to the DHS.82
D. Punishments
A new crime created by Chapter 246 allows the State to assess penalties against
those who fail to abide by the new law.83 If a firearms dealer or manufacturer fails
to provide approved firearms safety devices or to affix a proper warning label, the
dealer may have to pay a fine of $ 1,00 0 .M For the second offense, an additional
$1,000 fine will be imposed, and the offender will be prohibited from selling or
manufacturing firearms for thirty days.8s Ultimately, a gun dealer or manufacturer
77. See id. § 12088.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 246) (referencing section 12088.3(a) for the text of the
warning label).
78. Id. § 12088.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
79. Id. § 12088.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
80. Id. § 12088.3(b) (enacted by Chapter 246).
81. Id. § 12088.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
82. Ma § 12088.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 246).
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who violates the new law three times will be permanently prohibited from selling
or manufacturing firearms in the State of California.
8 6
E. Financing the New Law
To finance the cost of additional expenditures both the DOJ and the DHS will
incur as a result of the new law, a fee of no greater than $1 may be assessed against
gun purchasers by gun dealers for each gun purchased. 87 These funds will be
collected and deposited into the Firearm Safety Account to assist the DOJ in
fulfilling its duties imposed by the new law.88 The DOJ estimates it will spend an
additional $327,000 the first year, $307,000 the second year, and approximately
$250,000 annually to carry out the new tasks of creating standards for firearms
safety and certifying laboratories.8 In addition, the DHS expects to spend $77,000
annually to manage and analyze the submitted data as required by Penal Code
section 12088.5.90
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 246
Some theorists believe safety features on guns may not be the only factor to
consider in the effort to reduce unintentional gunshot injuries.91 The natural
assumption is that trigger locks prevent guns from being accidentally discharged,
and therefore, mandatory trigger locks will decrease the likelihood and incidents of
injury. However, skeptics are wary of the use of trigger locks as a preventative
measure, and argue that they create an even greater danger.92 The new law only
requires that gun dealers provide gun owners with a trigger lock;93 the assumption
by the Legislature that gun owners will continue to use the device after taking the
gun home may be flawed. 94 Skeptics of the law suggest that gun owners who value
86. Id.
87. Il § 12088.9(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
88. Id. § 12088.9(b) (enacted by Chapter 246).
89. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMnTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 130, at 1 (May 17, 1999).
90. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 12088.5 (enacted by Chapter 246) (stating that firearms accidents
involving children must be reported to the DHS).
91. See generally, e.g., Polston & Weil, supra note 17, at 15 (explaining the theory that unintentional
shootings could be reduced by changing both the design of firearms and the behavior of gun owners).
92. See Ralph D. Sherman, Trigger Locks Are Dangerous (visited Oct. 26, 1999) <http://www.ralphd
sherman.com/Press%2OArchive/98-09-12%20Hartford%20Courant.htm> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (arguing that trigger locks create greater danger when used improperly and should not be viewed as a
reliable method of firearms safety); see also SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 106, at
11 (Aug. 19, 1999) (presenting the argument that trigger locks by themselves will not address the underlying need
to educate gun owners on the proper use and storage of guns).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12088.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 246).
94. SENATE RULES COMMrrrEE, CoMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 130, at 13 (Aug. 25, 1999) (citing the
opposing argument to Chapter 246 that providing trigger locks to gun owners will not guarantee that the safety
devices will be used).
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the utility of trigger locks already own them, and those gun owners who do not own
trigger locks probably never intend to use one.
95
Even if the use of trigger locks is targeted at first-time gun owners, another
potential danger exists. Trigger locks are designed to be attached to unloaded
guns. 6 If a user inadvertently attaches the trigger lock to a loaded gun, the gun
could mistakenly go off when the user attempts to remove the device. 97 This
possibility multiplies each time the user attaches and detaches the device during
practice and hunting activities.98 Therefore, instead of preventing accidents, trigger
locks may actually facilitate them.' 9
In addition, gun owners could depend too heavily upon a trigger lock to prevent
accidental injury.' ° The highly skeptical NRA analogizes the use of trigger locks
to the popular auto security device "The Club."' ' Automobile owners attach "The
Club" to their vehicles, trusting the effectiveness of the device and ignoring the
potential that the automobile may still be stolen with the device attached. 102 If gun
owners use trigger locks in the same way automobile owners use "The Club," a
false sense of security may take hold, which does little to help educate gun owners
concerning firearms safety.'0 3
Another relevant analogy is the use of child-proof medicine bottles to prevent
accidental medicine consumption by children."0' At least one economist claims that
the number of children unintentionally poisoned per year has increased as a result
of child-proof medicine bottles, 05 because a failure by parents to properly educate
their children regarding the dangers of the medicine cabinet is a direct result of
reliance upon the safety features of child-proof medicine bottles
°6
On the other hand, providing a trigger lock to first-time gun owners may at least
prevent some injuries where a gun owner would never willingly purchase a firearms
safety device despite the risk of criminal prosecution for causing injury to a child
due to improper firearms storage. 07 Ultimately, the debate leaves lawmakers and
95. See Sherman, supra note 92 (stating that, because trigger locks are readily available and only cost $10,






100. SENATE RULES COMMrrE, COMMrrrEEANALYSIS OFAB 106, at I1 (Aug. 19, 1999).
101. See id. (citing the NRA's argument that trigger locks may create a false sense of security).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Sherman, supra note 92.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12035 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (creating a criminal punishment where
children under the age of sixteen injure themselves or any other person with negligently stored firearms).
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gun owners in a "Catch-22" situation, where weighing the benefits and burdens of
trigger locks seems limitless.
V. CONCLUSION
While existing law provides for criminal prosecution where one causes injury
to a child from negligently storing a firearm, no existing or new law imposes
criminal penalties for storing a gun without a trigger lock or storing the gun outside
of a locked gun safe. tY8 For a negligent gun owner to be charged, a child must first
be injured, which accomplishes little, as prosecutors currently are reluctant to fully
punish violators."° Children have the ability to operate firearms at a very early
age,1 and the technology to create safer guns is at least possible.1  However, fierce
opposition to firearms safety devices is based in part on the fear that any mandatory
firearms safety device is a step toward completely banning guns.112 Requiring
trigger locks, gun safes, and warning labels may be all that can be accomplished
through the legislative process. Proper education on firearms safety and expanded
criminal punishments may be the key to realistically reducing the number of
unintentional gun shot wounds.113 Nevertheless, Chapter 246 takes the first step
towards that goal by finally putting firearms safety devices into the hands of gun
owners. 
14
108. Id.; id. § 12036 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000); see supra Part U.A (explaining that criminal penalties are
imposed only when a child uses a negligently stored firearm to cause injury);
109. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining that the negligent storage of a firearm law is not
being enforced); see, e.g., supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (reciting the story of a grandfather who was
charged under the negligent storage of a firearm law after his grandson unintentionally shot himself, and
explaining that the grandfather's criminal charge was ultimately reduced to a misdemeanor).
110. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (reporting the results of a study which tends to prove
that children as young as three can apply sufficient pressure to operate a gun).
I 11. See supra Part H.C (analyzing the history of firearms safety technology).
112. Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
113. Polston & Weil, supra note 17.
114. See supra Part III (detailing the new requirements imposed upon gun dealers by Chapter 246).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Mentally Disordered Offenders (MDO) Law addresses the involuntary
commitment and treatment of prisoners with severe mental disorders.' The purpose
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960-2981 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000); id. § 2962 (amended by Chapter 16).
See generally Deborah A. Dorfman, Through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Filter: Fear and Pretextuality in
Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 805, 810 (1993) (considering the California Penal Code
provisions dealing with the release of mental health patients); Tanya M. Montano, Comment, Will California's
Sexually Violent Predators Act Survive Constitutional Attacks?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 317, 327 n.96 (1998)
(contrasting the MDO Law with California's provisions for sexually violent predators); Gregory B. Leong et al.,
Dangerously Mentally Disordered Criminals: Unresolved Societal Fear?, 36 .FoRENsIc Sci. 210,214-16 (1991)
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of the MDO Law is to assure treatment for mentally disordered offenders when the
offender's mental disorder is a factor in the commission of a crime "using force or
violence.' 2 Until 1999, the California Supreme Court had not considered the
question of whether an implied threat of force, rather than an actual display of
force, was sufficient to meet the "force or violence" provision in the MDO Law.
In People v. Anzalone,4 the court held that an implied threat of force was not
sufficient to sustain an MDO judgment. Chapter 16 is the Legislature's response
to the holding inAnzalone.6 Chapter 16 expressly provides that prisoners convicted
of crimes involving implied force are eligible for treatment under the MDO Law,
and adds certain arson crimes to the list of enumerated crimes for MDO eligibility.7
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The MDO Law
California has adopted the position that a prisoner with a severe mental disorder
should be treated for that disorder both in prison and upon release from prison.3 The
MDO Law requires that a prisoner be treated by the State Department of Mental
Health as a condition of parole if she meets the following criteria: (1) "The prisoner
has a severe mental disorder that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission
without treatment;" (2) "The severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or an
aggravating factor in the commission of a crime for which the prisoner was
sentenced to prison"; and (3) "The prisoner has been in treatment for the severe
mental disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to the prisoner's parole
or release."9 Prisoners who are adjudged to represent "a substantial danger of
(describing the problem of MDOs and society and citing California's MDO Law as an attempt to deal with the
problem).
2. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSiS OF SB 279, at 5 (Mar. 16,1999); see
CAL PENAL CODE § 2960 (West Supp. 2000) (indicating that the Legislature has found that MDOs should
continue to be treated upon their release); id. § 2962 (amended by Chapter 16) (providing a list of enumerated
crimes qualifying an offender for MDO status, and adding that the commission of a non-enumerated crime that
nevertheless involved the use of force or violence also qualifies one for MDO status).
3. See People v. Anzalone, 19 Cal. 4th 1074, 1076, 969 P.2d 160, 161 (1999) (indicating that the
California Supreme Court considered this case to settle the issue).
4. 19 Cal. 4th 1074,969 P.2d 160 (1999).
5. Id. at 1082, 969 P.2d at 162.
6. SENATE COMMrrTEEON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 279, at 2 (Mar. 16,1999).
7. CAL PENAL CODE § 2962(e)(2) (amended by Chapter 16).
8. See id. § 2960 (West Supp. 2000) (declaring the legislative findings concerning prisoners with severe
mental disorders).
9. Id. § 2962(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 16). Under this section, a "severe mental disorder" means a
condition or illness that impairs behavior, judgment, or perception of reality. Id. § 2962(a) (amended by Chapter
16). This term does not include mental retardation or developmental disabilities, epilepsy, or addiction to
intoxicants. Id. "Remission" means that the outward symptoms of the disorder are controlled by medication or
other treatment, Id Evaluations are conducted by the person in charge of treating the prisoner and a practicing
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physical harm to others" are eligible for MDO status; these findings are certified
by the Board of Prison Terms. 10 The MDO Law was amended in 1995 to add a list
of specific felonies; commission of a listed felony can also determine MDO
eligibility." Thus, the State need only establish that the offender was convicted of
a listed crime, rather than prove the existence of certain underlying conduct, to
classify a defendant as an MDO. 2 The rationale for this amendment appears to be
that the original offense is helpful in identifying which prisoners are likely to be a
danger to society, as opposed to a prisoner's mental state and conduct while in
prison, which have not been good predictors.1
3
B. Court Interpretations of the MDO Law
The interpretation of the terms "force" and "violence" in the MDO Law has
been the subject of several cases. In People v. Collins,4 the court determined that
the words "force" and "violence" in the statute were not synonymous.15 Charles
Collins was convicted of grand theft after he took a Hulk Hogan doll from a four-
year-old child.'6 He denied using force or violence to take the doll, and claimed that
he had traded "a cartoon" for it.17 The court noted that there was sufficient evidence
to support the jury's determination that Collins qualified for MDO status.'"
In detailing the history of Penal Code section 2962, the court commented that
the standard for determining MDO status was unclear and construed the statute so
psychologist or psychiatrist from the State Department of Mental Health at a facility at the Department of
Corrections. Id. § 2962(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 16).
10. Id. § 2962(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 16).
11. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (relating the difficulty of interpreting Penal Code section
2962(e) and the suggestion by the court to amend it); 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 761, sec. 1, at 4602 (amending
CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962) (appending a list of enumerated felonies, including voluntary manslaughter, attempted
murder, certain crimes in which the prisoner "personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon," and non-
enumerated crimes "in which the prisoner used force or violence"). The fact that a prisoner was convicted of a
felony listed in section 2962 must be proven in addition to showing that the prisoner suffers from a mental
disorder. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962(e) (amended by Chapter 16).
12. SENATE COMMIrEE ON PUBLiC SAFErY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 279, at 5 (Mar. 16, 1999).
Provisions for determining if a crime qualifies under section 2962 have been rather broad in the past, leading to
difficulties in establishing that the crime involved force or violence. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text
(noting the previous wording of section 2962 and the circumstances of its amendment in 1995). See generally
infra Part .B (discussing interpretations of qualifying crimes under the MDO Law).
13. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIc SAFETY, COMMrr=E ANALYSIS OF SB 279, at 5 (Mar. 16,1999).
14. 10 Cal. App. 4th 690, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768 (1992).
15. Id. at 696-97, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772.
16. Id. at 693, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770.
17. Id., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770.
18. Id. at 698, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in advising the jury
as to the consequences of its verdict, and the verdict was reversed on this basis. Id. at 695, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771.
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as to avoid redundancy and to give each word significance.19 The court suggested
that the Legislature amend the statute to specify more clearly what crimes qualify
a prisoner for MDO status.20
People v. Pretzer2t also held that "force" and "violence" were not
synonymous. 22 On March 14, 1989, David Pretzer entered a Fresno animal hospital,
announced that he had a gun, and demanded that the employees give him drugs.2z
Although he was not armed with a gun, he did have a plastic razor in his coat
pocket.24 He pleaded guilty to two counts of false imprisonment, was sentenced to
three years in prison for this incident, and served this sentence in the state mental
hospital at Atascadero.25 Pretzer was certified as a "mentally disordered offender"
under California Penal Code section 2962, effectively continuing his involuntary
treatment at Atascadero.26
Pretzer appealed his MDO certification, contending that he did not meet the
"force or violence" requirement.27 In 1992, a California appellate court affirmed his
certification," noting that Pretzer was convicted of false imprisonment, which
requires either express or implied force to restrain a person's liberty.29 Reasoning
by analogy to the robbery statute, the appellate court held that Pretzer's act of
pretending to have a gun was sufficient to make a showing of force that overcame
his victims' resistance to escape.3" The impact of Pretzer was to accept the use of
implied force to sustain a determination of MDO status.3'
In People v. Anzalone,32 the California Supreme Court considered the use of
19. Id. at 698, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773. Before 1995, the MDO Law applied when "[t]he crime referred to
... was a crime in which the prisoner used force or violence, or caused serious bodily injury." Id. at 696 n.4, 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772 n.4.
20. Id. at 697-98, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 761, sec. 1, at 4602 (amending
CAL PENAL CODE § 2962) (listing specific crimes for MDO eligibility).
21. 9 Cal. App. 4th 1078, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860 (1992).
22. Id. at 1082, I1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.
23. San Joaquin Valley News Briefs, UPI, Mar. 15, 1989, available in LEXIS, California News Sources
Library (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Fifteen months earlier, Pretzer used a toy gun to force his
way into a Fresno television station during a live news broadcast, and demanded that the sportscaster read a
religious statement. Man with Toy Gun Disrupts News Show, Forces Sportscaster to Read Statement, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Dec. 5, 1987, at A3.
24. Pretzer, 9 Cal. App. 4th at 1081, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862 (1992).
25. Id at 1081, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861-62.
26. Id., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861-62.
27. Id. at 1082, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.
28. Id. at 1083, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
29. Id., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
30. "In the context of the robbery statute, [citation omitted] 'force' is not limited to an application of power
such as bludgeoning the victim. [citation omitted] The test is whether 'resistance is involuntarily overcome."' Id
at 1083, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863 (citing People v. Dreas, 153 Cal. App. 3d 623, 628, 200 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589
(1984)).
31. I., 11 Cal. Rptr.2dat863.
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force under the MDO Law. Russell Anzalone walked into a bank and handed the
teller a note that said, "This is a robbery, give me the money."33 Without showing
any weapon or displaying any other threatening conduct, he then directed the teller
to give him twenty dollars. 34 When the teller gave him the money, he left.
35
Anzalone was convicted of second degree robbery and sentenced to prison. 6 Before
his release from prison, the Board of Prison Terms determined that he was a
mentally disordered offender under the MDO Law; a trial court confirmed this
status.
37
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, Anzalone argued that his
commitment was improper because his offense involved neither actual force nor the
use of a dangerous weapon.38 The court determined that his crime did not involve
"the use of 'force or violence' within the meaning of section 2962, subdivision
(e)(2)(P). ' '39 To support its position concerning legislative intent, the court echoed
the Collins court's suggestion for the Legislature to clarify the offenses qualifying
a prisoner for MDO status.40 The Anzalone court reasoned that the Legislature, had
it so desired, could have expressly included the implied threat of force in its list of
crimes, as it had in other sections of the Penal Code.4' Therefore, prior to Chapter
16, California law followed the ruling of Anzalone and its theory that only actual
force would support a determination of MDO status.42
Im. CHAPTER 16
Chapter 16 amends California Penal Code section 2962 in three ways. First,
Chapter 16 creates a new subdivision allowing an MDO commitment to be based
upon a crime in which the offender made a credible threat to use force or violence
likely to inflict serious bodily injury.43 Second, Chanter 16 adds new arson
provisions to the list of enumerated felonies. Previously, the only arson included as
a specific underlying felony was arson causing "great bodily injury."44 Chapter 16
32. 19 Cal. 4th 1074,969 P.2d 160,81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (1999). The defendant died while his appeal was
pending, but the Supreme Court exercised its jurisdiction to consider the case. ld. at 1076,969 P.2d at 161, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 316.
33. Id., 969 P.2d at 161, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316.
34. Id., 969 P.2d at 161, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316.
35. l, 969 P.2d at 161, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316.
36. Id. at 1077, 969 P.2d at 161, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316.
37. Id., 969 P.2d at 161, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316.
38. ld, 969 P.2d at 161, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 316.
39. Id. at 1078, 969 P.2d at 162, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 317.
40. Id. at 1082, 969 P.2d at 165, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320.
41. Id. at 1080-81, 969 P.2d at 164, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319.
42. Id. at 1083, 969 P.2d at 165, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320.
43. CAL PENAL CODE § 2962(e)(2)(Q) (amended by Chapter 16).
44. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 761, sec. 1, at 4603 (amending CAL PENAL CODE § 2962) (including
"[a]rson in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 451" as one of the enumerated crimes).
McGeorge Law Review / VoL 31
adds any arson other than that causing "great bodily injury"'45 to the list of
enumerated felonies, and it also adds any attempted arson "that posed a substantial
danger of physical harm to others' 46 to the list of enumerated felonies.47 Finally,
Chapter 16 contains an urgency clause to prevent the release of, and guarantee
mental health treatment for, offenders who might otherwise be released under the
holding of Anzalone"
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
A. Fiscal Analysis
The addition of implied-force and arson offenders to MDO eligibility
requirements will likely increase the number of prisoners declared MDOs.4 9 Under
Anzalone, perhaps forty to fifty current MDOs could be released.5 Without Chapter
16, these prisoners would be released on parole, resulting in immediate savings in
treatment costs.51 However, these savings are offset by the potential for subsequent
offenses. 52 Chapter 16 allows these prisoners to be adjudged MDOs, resulting in an
initial cost of about $5 million for treatment.53 After initial costs, the combination
of implied-force offenders and new arson offenders is estimated to produce annual
costs of about $5 million.54
This cost seems to be minimal in relation to the State's total criminal justice
agency expenditures, which have been more than $10 billion annually since 1988-
89.Y In 1995-96, the corrections expenditures alone were approximately $6
45. CAL PENAL CODE § 451(a) (West 1999).
46. Il § 2962(eX2)(L) (amended by Chapter 16).
47. l
48. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 16, sec. 3, at 67 (providing that the new law becomes effective immediately).
49. See SENATECOMMITrEEON APPROPRATIoNS, COMMITIEE ANALYSIS OFSB 279, at 1 (Mar. 22,1999)
(detailing increased costs due to commitments under the new arson provision in addition to retention of implied-
force MDOs).
50. ASSEMBLY COMMITtEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSISOFSB279, at 1 (Apr. 14,1999).
Presumably, these are implied-force offenders who were adjudged MIDO under Pretzer, but would need to be
released under Anzalone. See supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text (relating the history of the MDO Law
under the Pretzer and Anzalone cases).
51. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OFSB 279, at 8 (Mar. 23, 1999).
52. SENATE RULES COMMIrTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS oFSB 279, at 8 (Mar. 23, 1999).
53. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 279, at 1 (Apr. 14,
1999) (estimating that MDO commitments cost the State about $107,000 per MDO annually).
54. The Department of Mental Health and the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency estimate that about
thirty MDOs would be affected annually-at a cost of $3.2 million-and if fifteen persons are adjudged to be
MDOs due to the added arson provisions-at a cost of $1.6 million-the cost could reach $5 million. ASSEMBLY
COMMtTTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 279, at 1 (Apr. 14, 1999).
55. This figure includes costs from law enforcement, prosecution, public defense, courts, and corrections.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CENTER, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Criminal Justice Agency
Etpenditures, Fiscal Years 1951/52-1996/97 <http'Jlcaag.state.ca.us/cjsctcd97/tabs /d97tb48.pdf> (visited Nov.
16, 1999) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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billion. 6 The costs of implementing and maintaining provisions in Chapter 16
would also be mitigated by reduced parole costs and potentially reduced
recidivism. 57 The cost of recidivism is spread across all aspects of the criminal
justice system, for these prisoners must be booked, prosecuted, defended, and
incarcerated again.58 Studies of the MDO program have shown a recidivism rate of
about five percent, while the estimate of mentally ill prisoners returning to prison
without the program is ninety-four percent.59
B. Comparison of Alternative Procedures: The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act
Provisions already exist for involuntary commitment and treatment of
dangerous persons. The Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act6° provides for
involuntary treatment of mentally disordered and gravely disabled persons.6' The
LPS Act is broader than the MDO Law concerning who may be treated,62 but the
treatment under the LPS Act is of shorter duration.63 Parolees with mental disorders
are not specifically addressed in the LPS Act.64 The California Code of Regulations
establishes procedures for revoking parole.65 If a parolee suffers from a mental
disorder that renders him a danger to the community, or if he has displayed conduct
56. Id. The total criminal justice agency expenditures for 1995-96 were more than $16 billion. Id.
57. See ASSEMBLY COimrITEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITiEE ANALYSIS OF SB 279, at 2 (Apr. 14,
1999) (estirrating reduced parole costs of approximately $100,000, with no estimate of savings from recidivism);
see also infia notes 58-59 and accompanying text (considering the scope of recidivism costs in the corrections
system and reporting decreased recidivism rates for prisoners in the MDO program).
58. SENATE RULES COMMrrEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 279, at 7-8 (Mar. 23, 1999); see CRIME STATE
RANKINGS 0 (Kathleen O'Leary Morgan et a]. eds., 1st ed. 1994) (listing the average cost of incarceration in
California in 1990 to be $21,816 per inmate, based on data from the United States Department of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics).
59. SENATE RULES CombrrTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OFSB 279, at 7-8 (Mar. 23, 1999).
60. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5550 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
61. Id. § 5001 (West 1998). The LPS Act also provides for appointment of a conservator for gravely
disabled persons. Id.
62. See id. § 5002 (West 1998) (stating that persons impaired by chronic alcoholism and mentally
disordered persons may receive services undertheLPS Act); id. § 5170 (West 1998) (allowing dangerous persons
and persons "gravely disabled as a result of inebriation" to be taken into civil protective custody); id. § 5200 (West
1998) (specifying mentally disordered and gravely disabled persons as persons who may be given court-ordered
evaluations).
63. Compare CAL. WELF. &INST. CODE §§ 5250, 5270.15 (West 1998) (providing that, after an initial 72-
hour holding peried and extension of fourteen days, persons dangerous to others and persons who remain gravely
disabled and unable to accept voluntary treatment may be certified for further treatment for up to thirty days), and
id. § 5260 (West 1998) (specifying that suicidal persons are eligible for continued intensive treatment under the
LPS Act for up to fourteen days after the initial holding period and extension), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 2970
(West Supp. 2000) (providing that, under the MDO Law, the district attorney may file a petition for continued
involuntary treatment at the end of the prisoner's parole or time of release from prison, if the prisoner did not agree
to treatment as a condition of parole).
64. See supra note 62 (detailing who may be treated under the LPS Act; no reference to parolees is made).
65. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 2600-2744 (2000).
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indicating a deterioration in mental condition likely to produce future criminal
behavior, parole may be revoked.6
While the idea of involuntary treatment of persons with mental disorders is
embodied in both the LPS Act and the MDO Law, the underlying purpose of each
set of laws is distinct. Both require prisoners to meet conditions to be certified for
treatment, but the procedures for certification under the MDO Law are more likely
to identify prisoners whose mental disorders are dangerous to society.67 The
purpose of the LPS Act is to identify potentially dangerous persons or persons
unable to care for themselves.( Prisoners who meet the MDO criteria are eligible
for commitment under the LPS Act; however, under the LPS Act, the burden of
committing such individuals after they are out on parole is on the ex-prisoner or
some member of the public.69 The eligibility requirements of the MDO Law
strongly suggest that its purpose is to hold those prisoners who have shown
themselves to be dangerous to the public as the result of a mental disorder, and to
adequately treat them before they are returned to the community.7 °
Without Chapter 16, the existing forty to fifty MDOs who could be released
underAnzalone would not necessarily receive treatment, and if they did, they would
receive treatment for a shorter period of time. These offenders may be more likely
to commit subsequent offenses without treatment.72 Under Chapter 16, these
prisoners are automatically considered for treatment, and will continue to receive
treatment until their condition can be kept in remission.73 Conditions for parole
66. idt §§ 2637(6), 2616(a)(14) (2000).
67. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5260,5270.15 (West 1998) (noting the conditions under which
persons may be certified for further involuntary treatment under the LPS Act), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962(a)-
(c) (amended by Chapter 16) (listing the requirements for prisoners eligible for treatment pursuant to the MDO
Law); compare CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 5201 (West 1998) (allowing any individual to apply for a petition
under the LPS Act to allege that a person is, as a result of a mental disorder, dangerous to others), with CAL
PENAL CODE § 2962(b) (amended by Chapter 16) (requiring that, as a condition of parole, a prisoner whose mental
disorder was a factor in the commission of a crime must be treated, subject to other criteria).
68. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5001 (West 1998) (expressing the intent of the Legislature in adopting
the provisions of the LPS Act).
69. See id. § 5003 (West 1998) (specifying that a person may commit herself for voluntary treatment under
the LPS Act); see also CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 5250, 5270.15 (West 1998) (discussing the procedure for
selecting persons for involuntary treatment under the LPS Act).
70. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2960 (West Supp. 2000) (stating one of the Legislature's findings of fact that
these prisoners should be provided with treatment before they are returned to the community).
71. See supra note 63 (comparing the treatment provisions under the MDO Law with other existing
treatment options).
72. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (considering the fiscal impact of Chapter 16 with respect
to recidivism, and noting that the recidivism rate for offenders in the MDO program is about five percent).
73. CAL PENAL CODE § 2968 (West Supp. 2000). If the condition does not go into remission, a petition
for continued involuntary treatment may be filed. Id. § 2970 (West Supp. 2000). If a prisoner falls to meet the
criteria of the MDO Law, the Director of Corrections may use the LPS Act to subject the prisoner to treatment.
Id. § 2974 (West Supp. 2000).
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revocation remain the same regardless of the presence of Chapter 16,74 but
evaluating prisoners automatically before parole is granted is more effective at
preventing future crime.75
V. CONCLUSION
Protection of public health and safety is the focus of the MDO Law. 76 Because
the conduct and the mental state of prisoners in prison are poor predictors of future
behavior on their own, the original offense is important in identifying which
prisoners are more likely to be dangerous to society.77 Chapter 16 includes implied-
force and arson offenders within the scope of the MDO Law.78 While procedures
already exist for involuntary mental treatment, they rely on someone who will take
the initiative to commence treatment after the prisoner is out on parole, rather than
the prisoner merely continuing treatment upon release into society.79 Automatic
consideration of a prisoner's mental health at the time of parole, with respect to
previous criminal activity, will probably be more effective in protecting public
welfare.80
74. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (addressing the existing regulations concerning parole
revocation).
75. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (comparing the underlying purposes of the LPS Act and
the MDO Law).
76. CAL PENAL CODE § 2960 (West Supp. 2000).
77. SENATECOMM1rM ON PUBLIC SAFEY, COMMrFEEANALYSIS OFSB 279, at 5 (Mar. 16,1999).
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962(e)(2)(L), (Q) (amended by Chapter 16); see supra Part III (detailing the
provisions of Chapter 16).
79. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing existing provisions for the commitment of
mentally disordered persons).
80. See supra Part ll.A (recapitulating California's position on prisoners with mental disorders and the
provisions of the MDO Law); supra text accompanying notes 67-70 (concluding that the likely purpose of the
MDO Law is to identify prisoners who are potential dangers to society and to certify such prisoners for mandatory
treatment).
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Insatiable "Up-Skirt" Voyeurs Force California
Lawmakers to Expand Privacy Protection in Public Places
David D. Kremenetsky
Code Section Affected
Penal Code § 647 (amended).
AB 182 (Ackerman); 1999 STAT. Ch. 231
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of privacy marks the boundary line in the battle between privacy of
individuals within society and the community in which they live.' This battle is
characterized on one side by an increasing encroachment of the community into the
private sphere.2 The other side is composed of persons seeking to assert rules, or
social norms, against other members of their community to protect them against
"injury to the inner person" caused by undue invasion into their private lives and
to allow them to remain unique and autonomous individuals.3 The common law tort
of invasion of privacy guards what some have called the rules of civility.4 However,
as predicted by the famous law review article by Justices Warren and Brandeis,
privacy is threatened on two fronts: (1) by the press;5 and (2) by the proliferation
of mechanical devices.6 The inevitable and periodic reconciliation between new
technology and the embattled moral standards of society has resulted in a recent
intensification of concerns over privacy.7 Use of video recording devices in public
places is one present manifestation of the old battle.8
1. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort,
77 CAL L. REV. 957, 957 (1989) ("Privacy is commonly understood as a value asserted by individuals against
the demands of a curious and intrusive society.").
2. L, at 957-58.
3. 1L
4. See id. (employing the phrase "civility rules" in discussing "the dissemination of information").
5. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890).
6. Il at 195.
7. Andrew Jay McClurg, Bring Privacy Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions
in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989,990-91 (1995).
8. Id.
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A rash of incidents involving surreptitious videotaping under women's skirts
and down their blouses in public places has fueled the fire of the old controversy.9
Inspired by newly available technology, some individuals have taken to the new
endeavor which some describe as a modem-day hunt for sport.' Three incidents in
particular have come to represent a source of frustration for police officials and
prosecutors alike.' All three incidents involved men caught in the act: one at
Disneyland, one at the Garden Grove Strawberry Festival, and a third at Huntington
Beach, all in Orange County, California.12 All three men were let go after
questioning because even though their behavior may have been "sick" and
"perverted," apparently it was not illegal.'
3
A man wearing a goatee spent eleven hours at Disneyland trying to slide a bag
containing a camera under women's legs.' 4 Relentlessly following women around
the park, the man would position the bag under their skirts or shorts for up to ten
minutes at a time.'5 In Garden Grove, a man filmed down women's tops at the
Strawberry Festival as they got off rides and walked around the park.' 6 In another
incident, police officers trained to spot sexual predators detained a man at
Huntington Beach who was carrying a camera concealed in a boom box. 17 The
officers noted the man was "acting strangely and following women around."' 8 After
reviewing his tape for images of children under age sixteen and observing only
images of adult beachgoers, police released the man.19
9. See Bill Rams, Cyber-Peeping: It's Growing, It's Frustrating, and It's Legal-Trend: Officials Say
There's Nothing They Can Do to Stop Men from Filming up Skirts in Public Places, ORANGE COUNrry REQ., June
26,1998, at AlI [hereinafter Rams, Cyber-Peeping] (describing an incident in which some men were caught using
video cameras to surreptitiously film up women's skirts and down their blouses); Bill Rams, Prosecuting Up-Skirt
Videotaping May Be Uphill Battle-Crime: Another Man Is Acquitted of Similar Charges. The Problems Is the
Law Doesn't Address the Offense, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 27, 1998, at B2 [hereinafter Rams, Prosecuting
Up-Skirt Videotaping] (providing the cases of David Wayne Lyman and John Lopez as examples).
10. See Bill Rams, Cyber-Peeping, supra note 9, at Al (quoting Robert Roy, an employee of an Irvine-
based Internet site) (stating that videotaping underneath skirts "is a high-tech, urban form of hunting").
11. See id. (quoting an outraged Sergeant Bob Conklin, who said that "[n]o one should have to feel that
they [sic] need to be careful because someone might stick a camera up her dress").
12. See infra notes 14-19 (describing the three incidents which were the impetus for the passage of Chapter
231).
13. Infra notes 14-19.
14. Peeping Toms Find Legal Ways to Film. Some Pictures Are Shown on Internet, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., June 27, 1998, at A3.
15. 1l
16. amns, Cyber Peeping, supra note 9, at Al.
17. Robert J. Manzano, Focus: Orange County Community News Northwest/Huntington Beach: Man on
Beach Detained for Concealed Video Camera, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at B2.
18. Id.
19. Id. The article illustrates that it was not against the law to surreptitiously tape adults at a public beach.
il
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Demand for "up-skirt" pictures has produced more than one hundred Internet
sites devoted to this genre.20 A group of employees who work on such sites
routinely go "hunting" for "up-skirt" pictures. 21 Although video camcorders have
been in existence since 1985, the recent expansion of the Internet fueled the "up-
skirt" craze.22
As California lawmakers explored the prospects of amending the law to curb
such behavior, they discovered to their satisfaction strong support for a narrow
measure to stop the abuses. In fact, Chapter 231, which indeed amends the law in
this regard, received unanimous support on the floors of both houses of the
California Legislature. 23 Part II of this Legislative Note examines the legal
background supporting the right to privacy, including civil and criminal penalties
existing to protect that right. Part III outlines the provisions of Chapter 231, and
explains how the expansion of the right to privacy in public places is a departure
from existing law. Part IV of this Note analyzes the effect of Chapter 231 on the
right to privacy and its impact as a deterrent to "up-skirt" voyeurs. Finally, Part V
attempts to place the new law in the context of a changing society.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The tort of "invasion of privacy" was born after Harvard Law Review published
an influential law review article by Justices Warren and Brandeis in 1890.24 In
1960, Dean William Prosser separated the common law tort of invasion of privacy
into four distinct causes of action: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) publication of
private facts; (3) appropriation; and (4) false light.2 Many courts around the
country currently use Dean Prosser's definition of invasion of privacy, which is
articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 26 The tort of "intrusion" is
committed by "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
20. Robert Salladay, Assembly Targets Video Voyeurs; Peeping Toms Tape 'Upskirt' Shots, Post on
Internet, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 7, 1999, at Al; see id. (quoting Assemblyman Dick Ackerman, the principal author
of Chapter 231) (noting that the sites are "making millions and millions of dollars at" posting such images).
21. Id.; see also id. (detailing the activities of the so-called "V-team," which, according to a spokesperson
for Upskirts.com, Andrew Drake, "'infiltrate[s] by every means possible the places where women least expect to
be seen').
22. McClurg, supra note 7, at 1017-25. Justices Warren and Brandeis originally identified technology as
a looming threat to privacy. Id. The video recorder as a mechanical device poses a great peril to human privacy.
Id. Those using video camcorders to surreptitiously film women have found encouragement on the Internet. See
Rams, Cyber-Peeping, supra note 9, at Al (identifying the Web sites that are "teaching men how to film 'up-skirt'
or 'down-blouse' without getting caught").
23. SENATE COMMITIEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 182, at 4-9 (Aug. 13, 1999);
see id. (reporting that the Assembly voted 79-0 on May 28, 1999, and the Senate 40-0 on July 15, 1999).
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5, at 193.
25. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALL. REv. 383,389 (1960).
26. E.g., Fernandez-Wells v. Beauvais, 983 P.2d 1006, 1008 (N.M. Ct App. 1999); Doe v. Methodist
Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681,684 (Ind. 1997); Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 377 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).
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solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns ... if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."27
In addition to this common law tort, California has a statute forbidding invasion
of privacy which contains modern language to supplant the common law
definition.28 California voters even passed a constitutional amendment in 1974
which places privacy on a pedestal reserved for rights deemed foremost in
importance. 29 Nevertheless, for all the protection that these laws offer, no U.S.
jurisdiction has ever explicitly upheld the right of privacy in public places on the
theory that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public.3
In addition to civil penalties, California has a criminal Peeping Tom statute
which classifies as a misdemeanor looking into a private area in which the occupant
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 31 regardless of the location in which the
27. RBSTATaEENT(SECOND) of TORTs § 652B (1976).
28. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West Supp. 1999) (dividing invasion of privacy into physical invasion
and constructive invasion). California Civil Code § 1708.8 states:
(a) A person is liable for physical invasion ofprivacy when the defendant knowingly enters onto the
land of another without permission or otherwise committed a trespass, in order to physically
invade the privacy of the plaintiff with the intent to capture any type of visual image, sound
recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity
and the physical invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.
(b) A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant attempts to capture,
in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording,
or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity under
circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of
a visual or auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this
image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved without a
trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device was used.
It
29. CAL CONST. art. 1, § 1. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights,
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." Id.
30. See McClurg, supra note 7, at 995-96; see, e.g., Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (holding that when a researcher for Forbes Magazine took a picture of the plaintiffs at Miami
International Airport, the researcher did not invade the plaintiffs' privacy because "this tort does not apply to
matters which occur in a public place or a place otherwise open to the public eye"). But see Daily Times Democrat
v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474,478 (Ala. 1964) (refusing to mechanically apply the principle that invasion of privacy
cannot occur in public places where a woman's picture was taken by a newspaper photographer while her skirt
was suddenly blown up by jets of airas she was leaving a fun house atacounty fair).
31. CAL PENAL CODE § 647(k)(1) (amended by Chapter 231); California Penal Code § (47(k)(1) provides:
Any person who looks through a hole or opening, into, or otherwise views, by means of
instrumentality, including, but not limited to, a periscope, telescope, binoculars, caiera, motion
picture camera, or camcorder, the interior of a bathroom, changing room, fitting room, dressing room,
or tanning booth, or the interior of any other area in which the occupant has a reasonable expectation
of privacy, with the intent to invade the privacy of a person or persons inside ....
Id
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perpetrator is standing.32 Further, "peeping" is one of the acts which California
Penal Code section 647 characterizes as "disorderly conduct."33
In 1996, the Legislature amended the Peeping Tom statute2 4 The amendment
was intended to close a loophole which had stumped law enforcement officials and
allowed some peeping toms to escape punishment. 35 However, just like the
prevailing civil provisions protecting privacy, the criminal Peeping Tom statute was
not intended to extend to public places.36 Not surprisingly, the Peeping Tom statute
proved inadequate in reining in the "up-skirt" voyeurs operating in public. 7
III. CHAPTER 231
Chapter 231 amends the existing Peeping Tom statute with new language
designed to expand the definition of disorderly conduct.38 Under the pre-Chapter
231 Peeping Tom statute, the prohibited target of the disorderly conduct was an
occupant of a private area.39 Chapter 231 expands this prohibited target to any
identifiable person in any area, including a public place.40 Such a broad expansion
of potentially illegal conduct necessitates limitations.4' The statutory language has
to be narrow enough so as not to be struck down as vague or overbroad, as
32. See id. § 647(i) (West 1999) (applying to peeping toms only if the perpetrator is "loitering, prowling,
or wandering upon the private property of another").
33. l § 647 (amended by Chapter 231); see id. (including the following acts in the definition of
"disorderly conduct": engaging in lewd conduct in a public place, section 647(a); soliciting or engaging in
prostitution, section 647(b); aggressive panhandling, section 647(c); loitering around a public toilet "for the
purpose of engaging in or soliciting any lewd or lascivious or any unlawful act," section 647(d); loitering in
public, section 647(e); appearing intoxicated in public, section 647(0; peeping into an inhabited building while
trespassing upon private property of another, section 647(i); lodging in any place without the owner's permission,
section 6470); looking into a private area where the occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, section
647(k)).
34. 1996 Cal. Stat. ch. 1020, sec. 2, at4810. See generally Lisa F. Win, Peeping Tom Crimes, 28 PAc. LJ.
705,709 (1996) (reporting on the passage of the 1996 amendment to section 647(k), which prohibits Peeping Tom
crimes).
35. See Wu, supra note 34, at 709 (disclosing that the law was written to address refusal by courts to find
invasion of privacy where the perpetrator used a device such as a video camera).
36. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (explaining that historically, privacy could not be
invaded in a public place).
37. Rams, Cyber-Peeping, supra note 9, at Al.
38. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (amended by Chapter 231) (classifying as a misdemeanant:
[a]ny person who uses a concealed camcorder, motion picture camera, or photographic camera of any
type, to secretly videotape, film, photograph, or record by electronic means, another, identifiable
person under or through the clothing being worn by that other person.... without the consent or
knowledge of that other person, with the intent to arouse, appeal to or gratify the lust, passions, or
sexual desires of that person and invade the privacy of that other person, under circumstances in which
the other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy).
39. 1996Cal. Stat. ch. 1020, sec. 2, at4810.
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2).
41. Cf. SENATECOMMITEEON PUBLICSAFETY, COMMrrTEEANALYSISOFAB 182, at4-9 (June 8,1999)
(explaining that laws which do not define "disorderly conduct" with a reasonable degree of certainty risk violating
the United States and California guarantees of due process).
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California Penal Code section 647(e) once was.42 Therefore, lawmakers adopted
limiting language to narrow the scope of the targeted offense.43
In order for conduct to fall under the definition of Chapter 231, it must meet all
of the following conditions.' First, a person must use a concealed device to secretly
film or record another person under or through the other's clothing.45 Second, the
person being recorded must be identifiable.46 Third, the recording must be "for the
purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn by, th[e] other
person.' 7 Fourth, such a recording must be done without the consent or knowledge
of the other person.4 Fifth, the disorderly conduct described above must be done
with the specific intent "to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, passions or sexual
desires" of the perpetrator.4 9
Chapter 231 is aimed at providing law enforcement with a tool to address
concerns occasioned by the three highly publicized incidents in Orange County.50
Moreover, it answers the legislators' concerns over emerging infrared technology,
which may allow victims to be viewed through their clothing in normal lighting.51
However, Chapter 231 is not meant to criminalize the work of private investigators,
photojournalists or law enforcement officers. 52
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
The incidents which necessitated this amendment required a swift and sure
response.53 Nevertheless, while the intent behind Chapter 231 is admirable, its
42. See Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 252 (1979) (holding that "vaguo statutory
language... creates the danger that police, prosecutors, judges and juries will lack sufficient safeguards to reach
their decisions"); cf., e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (striking down California Penal Code
section 647(e), an anti-loitering statute, for vagueness, as it was likely to lead to arbitrary enforcement in the
definition of the word "identification"). Kolender was a declaratory judgment action brought by a man who was
convicted under section 647(e) for falling to "identify" himself to police when he was stopped while walking on
a vacant street late at night. Id. at 354 n.2.
43. SENATE COMMI'EE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 182, at 4-9 (June 8, 1999).
44. CAL PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (amended by Chapter 231).
45. Id.; see id. (defining such a concealed device as a video camcorder, motion picture camera, or





50. See SENATE CoMMIrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrTr ANALYSIS OF AB 182, at 3 (June 8, 1999)
(identifying the three incidents in Orange County as the specific impetus for Chapter 231); see also supra text
accompanying notes 11-18 (recapitulating these incidents).
51. SENATE COMMITI'EE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 182, at 3 (June 8, 1999).
52. 1d at 4.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 9-18 (detailing the intrusive acts of some "up-skirt" voyeurs, which
could not be halted by law enforcement officer. without amending existing law).
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enforcement may prove problematic.?* The language of the statute requires that the
victims of the crime be identifiable.5 5 However, one of the main reasons that
Chapter 231 was needed is the fact that the victims could not be identified from the
pictures taken by the voyeurs. 6 These victims could not sue for invasion of privacy
in civil court precisely for this reason.57 Furthermore, defense arguments would
undoubtedly stray to the question of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
existed under the circumstances.58 A woman wearing a "short skirt" or a "see-
through blouse" may not reasonably expect that her undergarment would remain
unobserved. 9 Still, even if such a woman expects her undergarments to be seen by
the naked eye, she may not necessarily assent to being videotaped for sexual
purposes.'
Proof that visual recordings were made for purposes of sexual gratification
presents an additional problem for prosecutors. 6' Because the law requires this
specific intent element, employees of commercial enterprises, such as those on the
Internet, would not fall within its scope.62 Any would-be video voyeur could cast
reasonable doubt on the purpose of his or her activities simply by securing an
inexpensive "up-skirt" Internet site for supposedly commercial purposes rather than
sexual gratification.3 Not only are Internet "up-skirt" voyeur sites not concerned
about the passage of Chapter 231, they are thankful for its passage. 64 An unfortunate
54. See SENATECOMMITEEON PuBuCSAFEy, COMMrrrEEANALYSISOFAB 182, at4-9 (June 8,1999)
(noting the myriad of problems associated with enforcement of the amendment).
55. CAL PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (amended by Chapter 231); see also SENATE COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC
SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 182, at 5 (June 8, 1999) (raising the "issue of whether a defendant can be
found guilty of criminal violation of privacy where it cannot be determined whose privacy was invaded").
56. See Salladay, supra note 20, at Al (illustrating from the comments of Andrew Drake, the spokesman
for Upskirts.com, why it is so difficult for victims to sue in civil court, and now under the Penal Code, even if the
element of expectation of privacy is met: "We never show women's faces. It would be very hard to recognize
someone from their behind. Their faces are blurred out.").
57. Il
58. See CAL PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (amended by Chapter 231) (requiring the victim to have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy"); SENATECOMMrrrEEON PIJBuCSAFETY, COMMrIrEEANALYSIS OFAB 182,
at 5-7 (June 8, 1999) (characterizing this issue as "particularly difficult in situations where (1) the victim wears
a 'short skirt' which allows observation without any 'extraordinary effort by the defendant,' and (2) where the
victim is wearing transparent clothing").
59. Cf. SENATE COMMrrrEEON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 182, at 7 (June 8, 1999).
60. See id. (observing that the issue revolves around the victim's reasonable expectation of privacy);
McClurg, supra note 7, at 1036-41 (asserting that a person does not automatically assume the risk of being
photographed or videotaped simply by leaving home).
61. See SENATECOMmrrTEON PUBLCSAFETY, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 182, at 7-8 (June 8, 1999)
(explaining that the requirement that the "defendant have surreptitiously visually recorded the underclothing or
body of another for purposes of sexual gratification" will exclude defendants who act for commercial purposes,
such as those engaged in an Internet "up-skirt" enterprise).
62. Id.
63. IL
64. See Robert Salladay, Voyeur Videos Skirting the Law? Web Site Showing Tapes of Women Gets
Unexpected Boost, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 27, 1999, at A19 (reporting an upsurge in business for Internet voyeur
sites due to the recent spotlight focused on the issue by "the media, the Legislature and [Governor] Davis").
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and unexpected effect of the growing focus on the "up-skirt" voyeur problem has
been an increase in business for Internet voyeur site entrepreneurs.65 Also, the new
law might not encompass visually recorded "down blouse" images wherein the
victim was "bent over from the waist."66 With so many loopholes in the new law,
that many of the intended targets of Chapter 231 would be deterred is unlikely,
except perhaps for the "lone fetishist" who is not sophisticated enough to "skirt" the
law.67
V. CONCLUSION
Necessary limitations handcuffing Chapter 231 are likely to make enforcement
and prosecution of most "up-skirt" voyeurs ineffective.68 However, Chapter 231
does extend the reach of privacy protections by explicitly recognizing a right to
privacy in public places. 69 Prior to Chapter 23 l's passage, statutory and common
law regulating intrusion had stopped short of recognizing a right to privacy in
public places.70 Regardless of the practical effectiveness of Chapter 231, it
represents a shift of the boundary line in the battle between privacy of individuals
within society and the community in which they live in favor of individual privacy,
and therefore impacts the relatively new but dynamic field of privacy law.
71
65. Ifl
66. See SENATECOMMIFrEEON PuBuCSAFETy, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 182, at 8-9 (June 8,1999)
(implying that when the victim "is bent over from the waist," her body or undergarments may be viewed in the
open and a device need not be concealed or otherwise kept secret in order to film the victim, and further implying
that such filming would not capture the image of the victim under or through her clothing, a requirement of the
new law).
67. See id. at 8-9 (predicting that prosecutors will have a difficult time establishing intent of sexual
gratification unless the defendant is caught during an act of masturbation).
68. Supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
69. CAL PENAL CODE § 647(k)(2) (amended by Chapter 231).
70. Supra Part H.
71. Supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The California Legislature was active in the area of gun control during the
summer of 1999. The session saw debates over bills concerning the ban of assault
weapons, proposed safety standards for handguns in California, and the enactment
of legislation placing a cap on the number of handguns purchased by citizens each
month. Some of this legislation was not so new;' however, a new administration
provided hope for the passage of laws that had been rejected many times before.
The efforts were successful in part. Gun control proponents won the long-waged
battle over the assault weapons ban,2 as the Legislature passed Chapter 129, finally
enacting a comprehensive definition of the assault weapons to be banned.
Additionally, Chapter 128 was among the new laws enacted, restricting prospective
firearms buyers to one handgun per month. Furthermore, the Legislature also passed
Chapter 248, outlawing Saturday Night Specials in California and guaranteeing gun
owners a level of safety from their weapons.
To provide background information regarding these important laws, Part II of
this Legislative Note will address the constitutional issues regarding the regulation
of firearms by the states. Part III details the expansion of California's assault
weapons ban, examining Chapter 129, the most recent California law on the matter.
Part IV discusses Chapter 128, the new one-handgun-a-month law. Part V concerns
the minimum safety standards of Chapter 248, which bans Saturday Night Specials.
1. See infra note 20 and accompanying text (detailing the history of failed attempts at assault weapons
ban legislation in California).
2. See itfra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining how the gun control lobby has tried to pass
similar laws many times in the past).
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Finally, this Note concludes by commenting upon the strength of the newly enacted
legislation in this field.3
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: THE LAST UNINCORPORATED
AMENDMENT?
A powerful lobby dins into the ears of our citizenry that these gun
purchases are constitutional rights protected by the Second
4Amendment....
Despite the fact that many guarantees of the Bill of Rights have been applied
against both the state and federal government, a question still exists as to which
constitutional provisions found in the Bill of Rights may restrict the powers of the
states--and this question manifests itself most saliently in the argument over
whether the Second Amendment6 bars the state regulation of firearms. The Second
Amendment originally was a vibrant piece of national defense guaranteeing an
armed citizen militia, but disuse of the militia system led to replacement of citizen
militias by the National Guard.7 The Second Amendment might have passed into
a comfortable state of historical anachronism if not for a popular belief that it
somehow granted a constitutional right to own guns.8 Despite its popularity, this
belief may be incorrect. 9
The Supreme Court has not had much to say on this subject, and what it has
said is more than a little dusty. Two nineteenth century cases are the only major
statements from the Supreme Court on the matter, both holding that the Second
Amendment does not apply to or restrict the power of the states to regulate
firearms.10 The Supreme Court has said on many occasions that the Bill of
Rights-the first ten amendments to the Constitution protecting the rights of
3. Infra Part VI.
4. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5. 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 976 (1998).
6. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. H1.
7. Hickman v. Block, 81 R3d 98, 102 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996).
8. See Richard B. Schmidt, Whnose Right? The 2nd Amendment: It's a Constant and Confuising Refrain;
NRA's Favorite Hobbyhorse Rarely Appears in Court; Militias vs. the Individual; 'You Want to Win Your Case',
WALL ST. J., May 25, 1999, at Al (discussing poll results showing that 80% of Americans believe that the Second
Amendment confers upon them the right to bear arms).
9. See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United
States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REv 961, 963 (1995-96) (discussing the
recommendation of the American Bar Association House of Delegates to encourage legal professionals to "educate
the public and lawmakers regarding the meaning of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution"
to correct existing misapprehensions concerning the rights protected in the Amendment).
10. See id. at 977-81 (discussing United States v. Cruishank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), and Presser v. Illinois,
116 U.S. 252 (1886), cases holding that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states).
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individuals-affects the federal government only, and does not automatically
restrict the actions of the states." Over time, however, the Court has recognized
certain rights as being fundamental to individual liberty, holding the states in check
as the Court applies a process called selective incorporation. 2 Under this process,
the Court finds that select provisions of the Bill of Rights guarantee individuals
protection from both state and federal government action.' 3 The Supreme Court
decisions noted above were decided before the modem trend of selective
incorporation, but later cases have refused to recognize the Second Amendment as
encompassing an individual right against firearms-related state regulation. 14 Absent
a provision in a state constitution granting such a right, individuals cannot expect
to be free from state interference with their rights to gun ownership. Because
California does not grant such a right to its citizens,' 5 the State Legislature may
freely regulate firearms. Lower federal courts have employed the above
interpretation of the Second Amendment's application to the states.' 6 Supreme
Court Justice Douglas even felt so comfortable as to state, "There is under our
decisions no reason why stiff state laws governing the purchase and possession of
pistols may not be enacted."'
7
III. BANNING ASSAULT WEAPONS: CHAPTER 129
With the recent tragedies in Littleton, Colorado, and similar incidents
throughout the nation fresh in the public mind, 8 the California Legislature passed
Chapter 129, finally securing a comprehensive assault weapons ban in the State.' 9
Enactment of Chapter 129 caps a long legislative history: four times in ten years,
11. 21A AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 976 (1998).
12. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 404 (1998).
13. Id.
14. See Hicknan v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 103 n.10 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing the Ninth Circuit's reading of the
Second Amendment in Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992) for the
proposition that the "Second Amendment is not incorporated against the states").
15. See Thomas B. McAffee & Michael I. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms:
Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 781, 893-99 (1997) (noting that forty-three
states, excluding California, grant their citizens the right to bear arms).
16. Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106
(6th Cir. 1976); Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610,610 (3d Cir. 1973); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n
v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 193,210 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
17. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
18. See James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Details; Attack at School Planned a Year Authorities Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999, § 1, at I (discussing the shootings at Columbine High School and copycat incidents
throughout the country); John T. McQuiston, Terror in Littleton: The Echoes; Wave of Copycat Threats Leads
to Swift Responses Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999, at A15 (same).
19. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 129, sec. 7, at 1553-54 (enacting CAL PENAL CODE §§ 12276.1, 12079)
(providing an expanded list of the definitions of an assault weapon); see id. (amending CAL PENAL CODE § § 245,
12001, 12020, 12022, 12022.5, 12280, 12285, 12289) (bringing existing statute references in line with the
expanded definition list of section 12276.1).
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the provisions of Chapter 129 appeared before the Legislature and the Governor,
only to be defeated on the floor of the Legislature or vetoed by the Governor.20
Finally, time and a new administration 1 have allowed these provisions to be
enacted.
However, Chapter 129 is not breaking new ground. In reality, it represents an
improvement on the already existing assault weapons ban in California.' Before
Chapter 129, California law provided a list of firearms models identified as assault
weapons; this list formed the basis of the assault weapons ban.23 The listed models
were, of course, banned, but as new weapons came on the market, they were
compared with the example list of model assault weapons, and if they were similar
in design, the new weapons were declared assault weapons and banned.24 The
problem with this approach is that it did not account for new designs and
innovations from manufacturers. Chapter 129 solves this problem by creating a list
of generic assault weapons characteristics to allow a flexible comparison for future
designs of firearms.2' The law is no longer limited by last year's model.
A. Existing Restrictions on Assault Weapons
1. The Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act
In January 1989, California was given the reason it needed to become the first
state to enact an assault weapons ban.26 In the city of Stockton, just forty miles
south of the State capitol, a gunman fired more than 100 rounds from an AK-47
assault rifle at a schoolyard of children.27 Among the dead that day were the
gunman and five children.2 In addition, twenty-nine children and one teacher were
wounded.29
20. The following bills were introduced in the California Legislature, but failed to pass into law: AB 2560
(1998) (as introduced on Feb. 23, 1998, but not enacted); AB 23 (1996) (as introduced on Dec. 2, 1996, but not
enacted); SB 1128 (1993) (as introduced on Mar. 8, 1993, but not enacted); AB 334 (1989) (as introduced on Jan.
23, 1989, but not enacted).
21. In 1999, Gray Davis succeeded to the governorship after many years of Republican rule.
22. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Roberti-Roos Act, California's Assault Weapons Ban).
23. Infra text accompanying note 37 (detailing the provisions of the model list of assault weapons that
formed the basis of the Roberti-Roos Act's definition of an assault weapon).
24. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (defining the California Attorney General's and the
courts' role in defining weapons new to the market as assault weapons subject to the ban).
25. See infra Part HL.B (detailing the provisions of Chapter 129 and the expanded definition of an assault
weapon).
26. Thomas E. Romano, Note, Firing Back- Legislative Attempts to Combat Assault Weapons, 19 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 857, 860 (1995).





The Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act3 ° was California's response.3'
The Roberti-Roos Act declares that the banned weapons are "particularly dangerous
in the hands of criminals and serve no necessary hunting or sporting purpose for
honest citizens. '32 The Act bans the manufacture, distribution, importation, sale,
transfer, and possession of assault weapons by certain persons. 3 In addition to
outlawing assault weapons, the Act also requires current gun owners to register
their weapons with the State Attorney General's office 4 Possession of assault
weapons is limited to certain locations.35 Violations of these provisions are felony
offenses.
3 6
The Legislature chose to define the term "assault weapon" in the Roberti-Roos
Act by listing certain makes and models as banned and by providing that these
makes and models should be used as examples in determining which later assault
weapons should be banned.37 The innovative technique used by the California
Legislature to define assault weapons would be used later as a model for legislation
in other jurisdictions.38
The Roberti-Roos Act included provisions allowing the Attorney General to
seek declarations from state courts that certain firearms should be declared assault
weapons,39 the hope being that manufacturers would not escape the effect of the
new law merely by changing the model's name. The Legislature gave guidance to
the courts and the Attorney General in making this determination by declaring that
renamed, redesigned, or renumbered models would automatically be subject to the
30. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 19, sec. 3, at 64-70 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12290).
31. Romano, supra note 26, at857-58.
32. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 19, see. 5, at 69-70.
33. CkL PENAL CODE § 12280(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 129); see also id §§ 12021(a)-(b), (d),
12021.1(b) (West Supp. 2000) (banning possession of assault weapons by certain persons including persons
deemedmentally incompetent and convicted felons), CALWELF.&INST.CODE §§ 8100(a)-(b), 8103(a)(1), (b)(1),
(c)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1), (f)(1), (g)(1) (West 1998) (same).
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12285(a) (amended by Chapter 129).
35. Id. These places include: (1) the owner's residences, business establishments, and other properties; (2)
the properties of others, when the gun owners appear thereon with the property owners' permission; and (3) target
ranges, shooting clubs licensed by the Fish and Game Department, and firearms exhibitions sponsored by or
endorsed by law enforcement agencies or state or federal government agencies that promote education and
proficiency about firearms. 1d; see also id (limiting transportation to and from the above-mentioned places or
to the facilities of a licensed gun dealer per California Penal Code section 12071 for service and repair in
accordance with California Penal Code Section 1026.1).
36. Id § 12280(a) (amended by Chapter 129).
37. Id § 12276(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1999).
38. See Romano, supra note 26, at 860 (providing examples ofjurisdictions such as New Jersey and the
federal government following California's method of banning assault weapons); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-924
(West Supp. 1999) (providing a law similar to California's); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-1 (West 1990) (same).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12276(d), 12276.5(a) (West Supp. 1999).
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ban.40 By providing a list of characteristics of assault weapons,4 the Legislature
gave the courts some needed flexibility to address changes in design over time.
2. The Federal Assault Weapons Moratorium of 1994
Five years after California's passage of the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons
Control Act, the United States Congress convened to discuss crime and gun
control.42 The California law served as a model43 for the federal Public Safety and
Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act." This Act's definition of "assault
weapons" is similar to the California approach in that both use the model and
characteristics list to define assault weapons.45 The federal law went further than the
California approach, however, in one respect-it placed a limit on magazine size.' 6
In other ways, the law fell short of the California Act. The federal law is not a true
ban, but only a moratorium set to expire at the end of ten years.47 Furthermore, the
federal law does not provide for a registration system for owners like that in the
California Act.48 The list of banned weapons is also very short compared to
California's: the federal statute lists nineteen banned weapons to California's fifty.4 9
The assault weapons characteristics list found in the federal law may be helpful to
other states wishing to enact their own laws. Prior to the federal Act's passage, this
approach was used first by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms in 1989
in its own efforts to control assault weapons in the United States.50 In the same year,
the Bush Administration banned the importation of assault weapons possessing
some of the following characteristics: large capacity magazines, folding stocks,
pistol grips, flash suppressors, bipods, bayonet and grenade launcher mounts, and
night sights. These efforts by the executive branch provided the basis for the
40. d. § 12276.5(a)(1).
41. See id. (listing characteristics to be considered by the court, including: folding or retractable stocks;
larger magazine sizes; adjustable sights; and bayonet mounts).
42. Adam Clymer, Congress Calls It Quits: Final Hours; Rancor Leaves Its Mark on 103d Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, § 1, at 1.
43. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1996 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-924 (West Supp. 1999)).
45. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-922 (West Supp. 1999) (including in its ban of assault weapons a
provision banning high-capacity magazines) with CAL. PENALCODE §§ 12276(a)-(c), 12276.5(a)(1) (West 1992)
(failing to ban high-capacity magazines).
46. 18 U.S.C.A. § 921.
47. Id. §§ 921-924 (West Supp. 1999).
48. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12285(a) (amended by Chapter 129) (detailing the registration system for
California gun owners).
49. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-924 (West Supp. 1999) (listing 19 weapons to be banned), with CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12290 (West Supp. 1999) (banning 50 types of firearms as assault weapons).
50. Lenett, supra note 27, at 574.
51. Id.at574n.5.
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congressional characteristics list included in the 1994 legislation. 2 The federal
characteristics list now serves as a model for the California Legislature. 3
B. Chapter 129: Supplementing the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Ban
Chapter 129 states its purpose simply: to ban all assault weapons in the State
of California.54 It builds upon the Roberti-Roos Act by expanding the definition of
assault weapons to include a larger list of assault weapons characteristics. 55 The
statutor language describing these characteristics closely mirrors the language of
the federal moratorium. 6 Chapter 129's characteristics list is broader than that of
the federal law in that it defines a firearm as an assault weapon when the weapon
possesses two of the listed characteristics, as opposed to the federal moratorium's
three-characteristic requirement.57 Moreover, Chapter 129 enacts a permanent ban,
instead of the federal ten-year moratorium.58
One provision enacted by Chapter 129 that has been proposed and rejected for
the last ten years by the Legislature and the Governor? 9 is a limitation on magazine
capacity. 03 The newly enacted Chapter 129 bans any magazine-an ammunition-
feeding device-that carries more than ten rounds, declaring such to be a large-
52. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1996 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-924 (West Supp. 2000))
(outlawing the possession, manufacture, and transfer of: (1) semi-automatic rifles with a detachable magazine and
at least two of the following: folding or telescoping stocks, bayonet mounts, pistol grips protruding conspicuously
from beneath the weapon's action, grenade launchers, flash suppressors, or threaded barrels designed to accept
flash suppressors; (2) semi-automatic handguns that may accept detachable magazines and at least two of the
following: magazines that attach outside of the pistol grip, threaded barrels that accept flash suppressors, barrel
extenders, forward handgrips, silencers, or barrel shrouds; (3) an unloaded firearm weighing fifty ounces or more;
(4) a semi-automatic version of an automatic firearm; and (5) semi-automatic shotguns with at least two of the
following: ability to accept detachable magazines, a telescopic or folding stock, pistol grips that protrude
conspicuously beneath the weapon's action, and a fixed magazine with a capacity greater than five rounds).
53. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the use in Chapter 129 of the characteristics
list found in the federal moratorium).
54. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 129, sec. 12, at 36.
55. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000) (providing that firearms with any of
following characteristics are banned: a folding or retractable stock, a high-capacity magazine, adjustable sights,
and bayonet mounts), with id. § 12276.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 129) (expanding upon the previous definition of
assault weapons by employing the federal moratorium's characteristics list as noted supra at text accompanying
note 51).
56. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-922 (West Supp. 2000) (detailing the provisions of the characteristics
list of assault weapons in the federal moratorium), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276.1(a) (employing virtually the
same characteristics list of assault weapons as appears in the federal moratorium).
57. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (declaring a firearm to be an assault weapon when it possesses three
characteristics on the list), with CAL- PENAL CODE § 12276.1(a) (defining a firearm as an assault weapon if it
possesses two enumerated characteristics on the list).
58. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (providing the automatic repeal of the federal moratorium in ten years),
with CAL. PENAL CODE § 12280(a) (amended by Chapter 129) (banning assault weapons permanently in
California).
59. SB 1128 (1993) (as introduced on Mar. 8, 1993, but not enacted).
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(a)(2), (c)(25) (amended by Chapter 129).
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capacity magazine.6' Chapter 129 prohibits the manufacture, sale, possession for
sale, transfer, or lending of any large-capacity magazine.62 The drafters of Chapter
129 borrowed the large-capacity magazine ban from the federal moratorium. 63 The
magazine provision will prevent criminals from indiscriminately spraying large
volumes of firepower from semi-automatic weapons.6 The limited magazine
capacity would force these individuals to slow their rates of fire by requiring them
to reload more often, thereby allowing innocent bystanders to flee and police
officers to respond more effectively. Violation of this provision is punishable as
either a felony or a misdemeanor, depending on the circumstances of the violation.0
Chapter 129 expands the list of persons exempted from the assault weapons ban
to allow certain off-duty peace officers to use and possess assault weapons.6 The
Roberti-Roos Act currently offers only on-duty police officers this privilege.67 The
new amendment will follow the federal example by allowing retired police officers
to possess assault weapons and to have weapons transferred to their ownership from
their former agency at the time of their retirement.6
C. Analysis of Chapter 129
Chapter 129 might well succeed. Its expanded weapons characteristics list is
more inclusive than that of the federal moratorium, thereby making the
identification and banning of new weapons easier. No new high-capacity magazines
will be sold in California, and, as time passes, old high-capacity magazines will fall
into disuse and disrepair.
Nevertheless, no matter how much of an improvement Chapter 129 is, it is not
truly a ban; individuals may still posses assault weapons in California.69
Accordingly, assault weapons will still be available for criminals to steal and then
possess. However, under Chapter 129, these weapons will be highly regulated, and
the provisions governing these weapons are permanent, unlike those of the federal
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(31) (West Supp. 2000) (detailing the federal moratorium's provisions
dealing with high capacity magazines), with CAL PENAL CODE § 12020(c)(25) (amended by Chapter 129)
(providing a law similar to the federal law with regard to high-capacity magazines).
64. Cf Jim Newtown & Beth Shuster, The North Hollywood Shootout: LAPD Commander Turned Holdup
'Bedlam' Into Order, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1997, at Al (discussing the devastating effect of assault weapons
equipped with high-capacity magazines used in a recent bank robbery).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(a)2), (c)(25) (amended by Chapter 129).
66. CAL PENAL CODE § 12280(g) (amended by Chapter 129).
67. Il
68. Id.
69. See CAL. PENALCoDE § 12285 (amended by Chapter 129) (allowing the possession of assault weapons
under certain conditions).
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moratorium .70 Still, the California Legislature has already stated that assault
weapons are "particularly dangerous in the hands of criminals and serve no
necessary hunting or sporting purpose for honest citizens."'', To effectively prevent
assault weapons from being placed in the hands of criminals, perhaps the
Legislature should impose a complete ban.
D. Conclusions on Chapter 129
Assault weapons represent a danger to the people of California. By expanding
the definition of assault weapons and banning high-capacity magazines, Chapter
129 will limit the number of, and hence the dangers posed by, these weapons.
Chapter 129 is an improvement over existing law aimed at achieving this end.
Assault weapons will still exist in California, but with the passage of time, perhaps
their numbers will decline along with the threat.
IV. CHAPTER 128: THE ONE-HANDGUN-PER-MONTH LAW
A. Existing Restrictions on Handgun Sales
The sale of firearms is heavily regulated in the United States by both state and
federal law. Certain persons are barred by law from owning or possessing
handguns.72 Background checks exist to prevent these persons from acquiring such
handguns. 3 Transfers and sales of handguns must also be completed through a
licensed dealer.74 California law requires that a purchaser of a handgun produce a
firearms-training certificate before delivery.75 California law even regulates the
manner of storage and transportation of firearms.7 6
Despite these regulations, qualified purchasers have been able to acquire as
many firearms as they wish in one visit to a gun shop.77 This opportunity to make
a one-time purchase of an arsenal has afforded many criminals easy and quick
70. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12290 (enacted by Chapter 129) (regulating assault weapons
in California, banning them in large measure), with 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-924 (West Supp. 2000) (providing for
a temporary federal moratorium on assault weapons).
71. 1989 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 19, sec. 5, at 69-70.
72. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(d) (West Supp. 2000) (barring felons, those with a history of mental
illness, and other classes from possessing or purchasing firearms); CAL PENAL CODE §§ 12021(a)-(b), (d),
12021.1(b) ,West Supp. 2000) (same); CAL. WELF. &INST. CODE §§ 8100(a)-(b), 8103(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1),
(e)(1), (f)(1), (g)(1) (West 1998) (same).
73. E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s) (West Supp. 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12076 (amended by Chapter 128).
74. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(a) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring interstate sales or transfers of firearms
to take place through a licensed dealer); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072(d) (amended by Chapter 128) (stating that
intrastate transactions of firearms must also take place through a licensed dealer).
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12071(b)(8) (amended by Chapter 128).
76. Id §§ 12031(a) (West Supp. 2000); id § 12071(b)(14), (19) (amended by Chapter 128).
77. SENATE COMNITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 202, at 4 (June 8, 1999).
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access to handguns.78 A strawman, a person who may legitimately possess and
purchase handguns, is often used by a criminal to purchase firearms for him or
her.79 The strawman, with money provided by the criminal, applies for a handgun
or other firearms purchase, clears the background check, and, after receiving the
handgun, transfers it to the criminal. 0 Often, this type of transaction involves
numerous weapons, so a gang of criminals can be quickly equipped, or a black
market dealer can quickly receive an inventory for illegal sales on the street."'
Drafters of Chapter 128 hope to prevent this arsenal-shopping by placing a one-
handgun-a-month limit on purchasers.8 2
1. Twin Guardians: Federal and California Regulation of Firearms
Sales of handguns in this country are closely watched by authorities.83 Those
trafficking interstate are required to obtain a federal firearm license (FFL).'
California law also requires dealers to possess a State license.85 Purchasing or
dealing in handguns without these licenses is illegal in California. 6
Buyers of firearms are also scrutinized. Felons and persons with mental
illnesses are prohibited from possessing firearms in California. 7 A background
check exists under both federal and California law to prevent these persons from
obtaining firearms.88 Every person seeking to purchase a firearm must complete an
application for purchase. 9 If the applicant falls within a prohibited category, the
purchase cannot legally be completed. 90
78. See, e.g., Mark D. Polston, Civil Liability for High Risk Gun Sales: An Approach to Combat Gun
Trafficking, 19 SErON HALL LEGIS. J. 821, 821 (1995) (detailing the purchase by one strawman of $6,000 worth
of handguns, which were immediately handed over to a drug dealer).
79. David C. Anderson, Street Guns: A Consumer Guide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, § 6, at 20.
80. Polston, supra note 78, at 831-32.
81. See. e.g., Jack Cheerer, Corrupt Licensed Dealers Called Key Source of Handguns Used in Southland
Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1995, at BI (providing the example of one Los Angeles street gang that purchased
1,000 handguns).
82. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 202, at 3-5 (June 30, 1999)
83. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922-924 (West Supp. 2000) (detailing federal regulation of the possession and sales
of firearms).
84. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2000).
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12070 (West Supp. 2000).
86. Id.
87. Il §§ 12021(a)-(b), (d), 12021.1(b) (West Supp. 2000); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 8100(a)-(b),
8103(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1), (f)(1), (g)(1) (West 1998).
88. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s) (West Supp. 2000) (promulgating background check procedures for
purchasers and transferors of firearms); CAL PENAL CODE § 12076 (amended by Chapter 128) (same).
89. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s); CAL PENAL CODE § 12076(c) (amended by Chapter 128).
90. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(d) (West Supp. 2000) (barring felons and those with a history of mental illness,
among others, from possessing or purchasing firearms); CAL PENAL CODE §§ 12021(a)-(b), (d), 12021.1(b)
(same); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 8100(a)-(b), 8103(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1), (f)(1), (g)(1) (same).
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A popular method used by criminals to circumvent these cumbersome
regulations is gun trafficking.9' Sometimes gun trafficking is an expensive and
dangerous market; black market handguns oftei have a criminal history or carry a
high price tag.92 Selection and quality can be limited.93 For these reasons, criminals
may prefer new weapons, without a history, bought from a dealer having a large
inventory. Criminal records prevent some from doing this, and so the strawman
method is applied,94 despite the fact that California law prohibits such transactions
in the State.95
Some states' laws make finding a strawman difficult by limiting the number of
eligible buyers.96 For this reason, criminals often go out-of-state to purchase their
handguns in states with less restrictive gun regulations.97 Federal law disallows out-
of-state residents from purchasing handguns and prohibits parties from conducting
interstate strawman purchases.9" Despite these regulations, gun trafficking
continues.'
2. Plugging the Holes in the System: The Federal Effort
Until recently, a problem existed in federal government efforts to regulate gun
trafficking: the requirements for the license itself were few)°° One only had to
demonstrate that she was twenty-one years of age or older, present a Social Security
Number, pay a small fee of ten dollars per year, and affirm that she was not a felon
and had no history of mental illness.'0' These last affirmations were easily managed
with a lie because the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms could not
effectively run background checks on applicants due to funding and staffing
91. Polston, supra note 78, at 831.
92. Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 . CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59,72 (1995).
93. Lat
94. Polston, supra note 78, at 831-32.
95. See CAL PENAL CODE § 12070(a) (West Supp. 2000) ("No person shall sell, lease, or transfer firearms
unless he or she has been issued a license... "(emphasis added)).
96. Polston, supra note 78, at 829.
97. Id.
98. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(a)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 2000).
99. See, e.g., Debbi Wilgoren, Report Traces Guns Used in Crimes; D.C. Offenders Increasingly Getting
Weapons from Beyond Area, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1999, at BOI (giving the example of gun trafficking in the
nation's capi-ol, where handguns are essentially banned).
100. See 1 U.S.C.A. § 923(d)(1) (West Supp. 2000) (providing only four requirements to receive a federal
firearms license).
101. Id.
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limitations.12 With a few lies, criminals could get a FFL and then order as many
firearms as they wished straight from the manufacturer 0 3
Recently, the requirements for a FFL have been made more stringent.'04 The
once-nominal FFL application fee has been increased to $200 for three years, with
a $90 renewal fee for existing FFLs. t°5 An improved FFL application also requires
a fingerprint card and photograph of the applicant, which are needed tools in the
identification of criminals who may apply for a FFL.'0 6 The result has been a
decline in the number of FFLs nationwide.107 Criminals can no longer acquire a
shade of legitimacy by bucking the FFL system.'08
3. Damming the Leaks: Efforts in Other States
Some criminals have turned to interstate gun trafficking as a source for their
firearms.' t° New York City is one of the largest cities in the United States, and it
has had a crime problem to match that size. In recent years, gun regulations in New
York State have become restrictive, yet many criminals and gun traffickers have
avoided these laws by shopping elsewhere."0
For years, Virginia was the gun shop for New York City."' To address the gun
trafficking dilemma, Virginia passed a one-handgun-a-month law." 2 It limits
strawmen and other legitimate buyers to only one handgun per month." 3 The hope
102. See Polston, supra note 78, at 835 (providing the 1995 example of 200 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms agents performing in substandard fashion when given the task of monitoring 197,000 FFLs).
103. See Jack Cheevers, Corrupt Licensed Dealer Called Key Source of Handguns Used in Southland
Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1995, at BI (illustrating the criminal's ability to misuse the licensing system by
telling of the use of one FFL to sell illegally 1,200 handguns in one year); Four Indicted in Largest Gun
Trafficking Case in Nation, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 1999, at A33 (providing the example of one FFL who allegedly
falsified his application to obtain 1,000 semiautomatic handguns traced to crime scenes); James C. McKinley Jr.,
Dealer Accused of Selling Guns to Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1995, at B3 (detailing the illegal sales of one
FFL who originally paid $30 for a license that he used to supply a black market street dealer with inventory).
104. See Cook, supra note 92, at 79 (detailing the improvements in the FFL application and license
requirements).
105. 18 U.S.C.A. § 923(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2000).
106. Cook, supra note 92, at 79.
107. See Robert L. Jackson, Tighter U.S. Rules Result in 49% Fewer Gun Dealers in County Government:
Many "Kitchen Table" Sellers Who Were a Source of Firearms Used in Crimes Have Been Weeded Out, Offliials
Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at B3 (reporting that toughened standards have resulted in a drop of 56% of
licensed dealers nationwide and 63% in California).
108. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (discussing the formerly lax standards for FFLs).
109. Polston, supra note 78, at 830-31.
110. See id. at 830 (noting "the tendency for guns to be trafficked from weak to strong gun control
jurisdictions").
111. See id. ("In 1991, Virginia accounted for 41% of all the guns recovered at crime scenes in New York
City, more than any other state.').
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2 (Michie Supp. 1999).
113. Id.
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was that this would slow the flow of firearms to New York City.114 The results have
been mixed. 15 Authorities report that after Virginia's law was passed, the State
dropped from number one to number eight in the ranking of the source-states for
handguns seized at crime scenes in the Northeast.1 6 The results for New York City
tell a different story, though; in 1998, Virginia was still the number two source-state
for handguns traced from crime scenes in New York City.117 Virginia's law also
created another problem-it passed the gun trafficking problem to someone else. 118
Many gun traffickers followed the path of least resistance when it came to the
Virginia situation: when one state's laws are too restrictive, go to another state." 9
Regretfully, Virginia's neighbor, Maryland, soon became the stop for gun
runners.' 20 Maryland and Virginia had previously been the leading sources for
handguns for criminals in Washington, D.C., t2 ' where handguns are illegal for most
persons to possess.'2 Excluded buyers soon left Virginia for the State of
Maryland's gun shops.123 The response in Maryland was also predictable-within
a few years of the promulgation of Virginia's law, Maryland passed a one-handgun-
a-month law.2 4
However, one-handgun-a-month laws are not impregnable. Criminals have
found ways around them by simply increasing their numbers of buyers. t 5 The
method is known as "smurfing.', 26 Where just one strawman was used in the past,
now several are employed, each buying the limit of one handgun per month, with
several deliveries being made to the criminals employing them.127 Therefore, the
one-handgun-a-month law does not entirely prevent criminals from obtaining guns.
B. Chapter 128. California's One-Handgun-per-Month Law
California's Chapter 128 answers the call for limiting guns on the street by
allowing citizens to purchase only one handgun every thirty days.'28 One can no
114. Marl, Johnson, Virginia Gun Limit Has Enthusiastic Following but State Still Ranks High as Weapon
Source, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 6, 1998, at All.
115. Id
116. Mark Johnson, Gun-A-Month Law las Mixed Results in Virginia, Maryland, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER STAR, Oct. 9, 1998, at A4.
117. Id.
118. See id, (noting that gun traffickers left Virginia for other states with less-restrictive laws).
119. L
120. See Running Out the Gunrunners, WASH. POST, May 29, 1993, at A26 (detailing Maryland's response
to the gunranning racket).
121. Johnson, supra note 114, at A1.
122. Wilgoren, supra note 99, at B 1.
123. Johnson, supra note 116, at A4.
124. MD. AN. CODE, Art. 27 § 442A (1999).
125. Johnson, supra note 116, at A4.
126. Ia
127. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the normal strawman purchase).
128. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12071, 12072, 12076, 12077 (amended by Chapter 128).
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longer enter a gun store and leave with an arsenal of handguns. Chapter 128 gives
more power to an administrative watchdog, the State Department of Justice. 29 All
gun purchasers must apply to purchase a handgun, and this application is forwarded
to the State Department of Justice.130 Under Chapter 128, if more than one
application to purchase a handgun is filed by the same gun purchaser within thirty
days, the State Department of Justice must notify the dealer and the local police that
the applicant is violating the thirty-day limit.'3' The punishment for this crime
increases with each violation.1 32 First- and second-time violators will be fined $50
and $100, respectively.133 Offenses after that point are misdemeanors" carrying a
possible jail sentence of six months or a fine of fewer than $1,000.135 Each
application to purchase a handgun within the prohibited time period is considered
a separate violation of the law and is punishable as such. 136 Delivery of a handgun
to an ineligible applicant within the thirty-day limit is punishable as either a felony
or a misdemeanor, depending on collateral circumstances.' 37 Chapter 128 also
requires dealers to post a notice telling that persons may not submit an application
for a handgun purchase within thirty days of a prior application.
3 1
However, Chapter 128 does not apply broadly to all handgun sales in
California; it includes a long list of exemptions.
39 Law enforcement agencies,1 4
correctional institutions,"' private security companies," peace officers, 143 motion
picture, television, and theatrical companies, 144 individuals engaging in private
sales, 45 and collectors' 46 all may purchase handguns without prohibition by Chapter
128. Furthermore, Chapter 128 provides for persons who have had their handguns
lost or stolen, or who merely want their guns exchanged or returned, by exempting
those individuals from the thirty-day rule as well. 47
129. See supra Part IV.A.I (detailing regulation of handguns as overseen by the California Department of
Justice).
130. CAL PENAL CODE § 12076 (amended by Chapter 128).
131. Id. § 12076(d)(3) (amended by Chapter 128).
132. Id. § 12072(g)(5) (amended by Chapter 128).
133. lit § 12072(g)(5)(A)-(B) (amended by Chapter 128).
134. Id. § 12072(g)(5)(C) (amended by Chapter 128).
135. See id. § 19 (West Supp. 2000) (defining the punishment for a misdemeanor violation).
136. Id. § 12072(g)(5)(D) (amended by Chapter 128).
137. Id. § 12072(g) (amended by Chapter 128); see id. (including in the list of exacerbating circumstances
the attempted purchase of a gun by a street gang member or a person with a prior record).
138. Id. § 1207 1(a)(7)(E) (amended by Chapter 128).
139. Id. § 12072(a)(9)(B) (amended by Chapter 128).
140. Id. § 12072(a)(9)(B)(i) (amended by Chapter 128).
141. Id. § 12072(a)(9)(B)(iii) (amended by Chapter 128).
142. Id. § 12072(a)(9)(B)(iv) (amended by Chapter 128).
143. Id. § 12072(a)(9)(B)(v) (amended by Chapter 128).
144. Id. § 12072(a)(9)(B)(vi) (amended by Chapter 128).
145. Id §§ 12072(a)(9)(B)(vii), (ix) (amended by Chapter 128).
146. Id. § 12072(a)(9)(B)(x) (amended by Chapter 128).
147. Id. §§ 12072(a)(9)(B)(xi)-(xiii) (amended by Chapter 128).
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C. Analysis of Chapter 128
Regretfully, criminals can avoid Chapter 128 by using many strawmen to buy
their weapons. 48 This method, known as "smurfing,"'149 has already been used in
Virginia and Maryland. 5 0 Essentially, smurfing operates in the same fashion as
does a strawman purchase, except that the number of purchasers is increased as
necessary to avoid the one-handgun-a-month limit.'5' This method is especially
effective because one strawman or legitimate purchaser can buy a dozen handguns
in a year under Chapter 128,152 because although strawman purchases are still
unlawful, 53 the new law will not prevent them from occurring in fact. Nevertheless,
Chapter 128 does succeed in making the process more cumbersome, and this should
dissuade criminals from dirtying the legitimate firearms market.
Chapter 128 may be labeled as either a success or a failure, depending on how
one views the nature of the problem the bill attempts to address. The purpose of
Chapter 128 is to stem the tide of guns flowing to criminals by removing an easy
method of access for criminals to obtain them: the one-time strawman purchase of
an arsenal." 4 If this is viewed as the problem, Chapter 128 will likely be a success,
but if one steps back and looks at the larger problem-illegal gun
traffickingt55 -Chapter 128 does not make a dent.
Chapter 128, like most attempts at gun regulation, is concerned only with the
legitimate seller.156 It prevents a legitimate buyer or strawman from purchasing a
large number of handguns at one time.157 The problem with this approach is that
criminals have sources other than the legitimate market from which to access
weapons. t58 On the black market, guns that were legitimately purchased or perhaps
stolen can be sold without time-consuming background checks, waiting periods, or
148. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (explaining how criminals can avoid gun restrictions
by using strawmen).
149. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing the smurfing method of avoiding the effect
of one-handgun-a-month laws).
150. Johnson, supra note 116, at A4.
151. U,.
152. See SENATE RULES COMMmrEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS of AB 202, at 5 (June 30, 1999) (illustrating this
proposition by stating that one family of two can purchase 24 handguns in a year under Chapter 128).
153. See CAL PENALCODE § 12070(a) (West Supp. 2000) ("No person shall sell, lease, or transfer firearms
unless he or she has been issued a license.. .") (emphasis added).
154. See SENATE RULEs COMMITEEFLOORANALYSIS of AB 202, at 3 (June 30,1999) (stating that "[b]ulk
purchase limits are aimed at so-called "straw transactions"); see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text
(discussing the strawman purchase method and its significance).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93 (discussing the black market for guns).
156. see CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072(c)(6) (amended by Chapter 128) (limiting the purchase, by an othervise
authorized buyer, to one handgun every thirty days).
157. Id.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93 (demonstrating that a black market for guns exists).
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a thirty-day limit between purchases. 159 In fairness, Chapter 128 was not intended
to address the black market problem.'60 As a means of limiting legitimate gun
purchases, Chapter 128 may be a success, assuming dealers and authorities properly
maintain the background-check system.161 If the law is followed, no purchaser will
be able to obtain more than one handgun every thirty days.
D. Conclusions on Chapter 128
The problem of the one-time arsenal shopping spree for handguns has been
solved, partially. Chapter 128 prevents criminals from using a single strawman for
their shopping trips. Though "smurfing" is still a means for circumvention of the
law, the increased cost of hiring multiple strawmen and the tedious process of
managing numerous handgun orders will at least discourage the misuse of
legitimate firearms transactions.
V. BANNING SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALs: CHAPTER 248
A. Introducing the Saturday Night Special
In California, more deaths occur due to firearms than from auto accidents. 62
Among firearms, though, Saturday Night Specials are considered to be the most
dangerous, both because of their desigu and because of their prevalence. '63 Saturday
Night Specials are firearms characterized by "short barrels, light weight, easy
concealability, low cost, cheap quality materials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy, and
unreliability."'' 4 The name "Saturday Night Special" originated in the City of
Detroit when the connection was made between weekends and an increasing rate
of crime.'
Besides their use in criminal activities, Saturday Night Specials are unsafe to
the user and innocent bystanders because of their shoddy manufacture.'6 They
create problems for law enforcement because of their concealability, their difficulty
159. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (giving information on the background check methods
in place in California).
160. See SENATE RULES COMMrrrEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS of AB 202, at 8 (June 30,1999) (describing Chapter
128 as legislation designed to prevent "multiple purchases of handguns through legitimate channels" (emphasis
added)).
161. Cf. supra note 103 and accompanying text (providing examples of FFL misconduct).
162. Myron Levin, New Orleans Is Expected to Sue Gun Manufacturers; Lawyers Who Fought Tobacco
Firms Are Now Helping Cities Take on a New Industry with Liability and Negligence Suits, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1998, at CI.
163. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153 n.9 (Md. 1985).
164. ld. at 1153-54.
165. Id. at 1153 n.8.
166. Id. at 1153 n.9.
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to trace, and their increasing use by younger criminals, particularly children.167
These weapons have caused one court to state that "the Saturday Night Special [is]
particularly attractive for criminal use and virtually useless for the legitimate
purposes of law enforcement, sport, and protection of persons, property and
businesses."' 68
1. Buy American: The Only Way to Get Saturday Night Specials in the U.S.
Because of a legislative loophole, a number of domestic companies have seized
control cf the domestic market of Saturday Night Specials absent competition from
similar foreign-made handguns. 69 A particularly successful group of these
companies has a family connection. 170 George Jennings began a family legacy in
1970 when he founded Raven Arms. 7' Raven filled the vacuum created by the
passage of federal regulation of foreign Saturday Night Specials. 7 The Raven,
Jennings, and Davis companies, all owned by members of the Jennings family,
annually produce 400,000 firearms that market for as low as $35 apiece. 173 Because
of their location around the Los Angeles area, these companies have been labeled
the "Ring of Fire" companies. 74 In thirty years, Raven Arms and other Jennings-
family-owned companies have seized control of this niche market;' 75 these and
other Los Angeles companies produce eighty percent of the Saturday Night Specials
made in the United States.'
76
Jim Waldorf, chief executive of Lorcin Engineering Co., one of the Ring of Fire
manufacturers, has described his product as "the blue-collar gun of America.'
77
The gun is definitely a worker; for four years in the mid-1990s, the federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms reported that Lorcin's highest-selling model was
the firearm most often found at crime scenes.' 78 However, while this type of
handgun may be popular, it is not always safe. In a review of the Lorcin L-25, one
167. Id.
168. Id at 1154.
169. Cf. Myron Levin, Legal Claims Get Costlyfor Maker of Cheap Handguns; Firearms: Liability Actions
Trigger Bankruptcy, Public Scrutiny of Southland Firm and Its Enterprising Owner, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1997,
at Al, available in 1997 WL 14014085 (noting that Congress regulates the importation of Saturday Night Specials




173. Alix M. Freedman, Fire Power: Behind the Cheap Guns Flooding the Cities Is a California Family;
The Volatile Jennings Clan Makes the Pistols Favored by Criminals and Kids, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1992, at Al.
174. Levin, supra note 169, at Al.
175. Freedman, supra note 173, at Al.
176. Eva H. Shine, Comment, The Junk Gun Predicament: Answers Do Exst, 30 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1183, 1197
(1998).
177. Levin, supra note 169, at Al.
178. Id.
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critic stated, "We wouldn't pay any amount of money for a gun that self destructs
in a couple of hundred rounds. Stay away from this one.
1 79
2. Saturday Night Specials: A Threat to the Public and Law Enforcement
Cheap guns mean more sales, and regretfully, they also allow children to
purchase weapons.18 Black market operations funnel weapons to teenagers and
gang members in urban America.18 1 In the words of one gun dealer, "Here where
I live, every young kid has a .22 or a .25. It's like their first Pampers.' 82 Statistics
supporting this proposition give the frightening example of a five-year-old taking
a handgun to his kindergarten class. 83 Most children cannot afford the hundreds of
dollars needed for a "higher-priced" firearm, but they can probably raise money for
a cheaper Saturday Night Special. 84
Aside from being a low-cost, easily available firearm, the Saturday Night
Special also poses serious problems for both the user and law enforcement. When
testing a Raven handgun, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
noted that the gun failed the "drop test"; it discharged when dropped. 85 A firearm
owner, in a tragic moment of clumsiness, could kill himself or herself with such a
weapon. Saturday Night Specials are also made of lower-quality metal alloys that
have a remarkably low melting point when compared with those of other
handguns. 86 The metal used most often for Saturday Night Special manufacture is
a zinc alloy.187 Zinc alloys begin to melt at 700 degrees Fahrenheit.' 88 Higher-
quality firearms are made of stainless steel and melt at 2,400 degrees Fahrenheit. 89
The zinc alloy also frustrates police efforts to identify and trace Saturday Night
Specials through ballistics and serial numbers.' 90 The serial number can easily be
melted away; in addition, every time a Saturday Night Special is fired, the gun's
barrel is altered.' 9' However, most frightening of all are the dangers associated with
the product itself. In testimony before Congress, the then-General Counsel of the
179. Shine, supra note 176, at 1187.




184. See id. (providing the example of one handgun selling for as low as $45); Shine, supra note 176, at
1185 (reporting that some Saturday Night Specials sell for as little as $35).
185. Shine, supra note 176, at 1185.




190. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153, n.9 (Md. 1985).
191. ld.
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Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police stated concerning Saturday Night Specials,
"They misfire, fire accidentally, and backfire with some degree of regularity."
192
Aside from the dangers, this type of firearm is a criminal's dream: cheap, easy to
get, and hard to trace. 193 As an official from Lorcin Engineering stated, "Cheap is
synonymous with volume."' 94 The larger the volume, the larger the threat from
these weapons. The fact that many Americans are fed up with this threat has led
cities to file lawsuits against gun manufacturers, including the Ring of Fire
compamies.' 95
B. Existing Law
1. Existing Federal Law
In a country where the consumer is king, the United States regulates most
everything bought and sold-except for handguns.196 The federal government does
not regulate the safety of domestically manufactured handguns, weapons which by
their design are deadly.' 97 Firearms manufacturers set their own industry standards
for gun safety.'9" Even the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is not
allowed to regulate firearms. 99 This freedom from regulation has resulted in the
ironic occurrence that children's toy guns are more heavily scrutinized than the real
thing.200 Early in the CPSC's history, when the interest group Citizens for Handgun
Control initiated a letter-writing campaign to the CPSC calling for such regulation,
consumer product safety commissioners actually received death threats from people
opposed to gun safety regulation.20'
However, federal legislation of a very limited effect does exist. For example,
the Gun Control Act of 196822 was passed in the wake of the assassination of
presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy,20 3 who was killed with a Saturday Night
192. Id.
193. Levin, supra note 169, at Al.
194. Freedman, supra note 173, at Al.
195. Myron Levin, Chicago Sues Gun Makers and Sellers, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1998, at Al; Levin, supra
note 162, at Cl.
196. Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Federal Safety Law Targets 15,000 items, but Not Guns; Congress: For 25
years, Politics and Special Interests Have Kept Firearms out of Consumer Commission 's Reach, L.A. TIMEs, Feb.




200. See id. (noting that children's cap guns must meet safety requirements such as a certain decibel level
and distinctive markings, while real firearms are not required to carry safety devices or meet safety standards).
201. Id.
202. Gun Control Act of 1968 (Safe Streets Law of 1968), Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801,5802, 5811,5812,5821,5822, 5841-5849, 5851-5854,5861, 5871, 5872 ('West
1989 & Supp. 2000)).
203. Levin, supra note 169, at Al.
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Special manufactured in Europe.20' In response, Congress set high safety standards
for such imported handguns, but neglected to regulate domestically manufactured
Saturday Night Specials. 20 5 This left domestic companies with the market to
themselves, free from foreign competition, and allowed the rise of the Ring of Fire
companies and their domestic competitors.
2 06
2. Existing Law in Other States
To fill the domestic void of Saturday Night Special legislation, in 1997 the
Massachusetts Attorney General, acting under his authority to promulgate consumer
safety regulation, 27 banned the guns' sale in that State.208 Massachusetts law
defined the banned Saturday Night Special as any firearm: (1) whose parts are made
of a metal with a melting point of fewer than 900 degrees Fahreneit; (2) which fails
a barrel pressure test of 55,000 pounds per square inch; or (3) which is made of a
powdered metal with a density of fewer than 7.5 grams per cubic centimeter.209
However, Massachusetts law allows such firearms to be sold if they pass a
performance test comprised of an evaluation of the handgun after a series of test
fires of 600 rounds.210 The performance test also requires that the firearm pass a
"drop test" by not discharging when dropped.21' Massachusetts is not alone in its
attempts to ban "junk guns." Four other states-Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, and
South Carolina-have set similar safety standards for handguns. 12
204. See Freedman, supra note 173, at Al.
205. Brazil & Berry, supra note 196, at Al.
206. Id.
207. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1997) (bestowing upon he State Attorney General
certain powers).
208. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 16.02-16.06 (1997).
209. Id. §§ 16.00-16.09 (1997). See generally Benjamin Bejar, Wielding the Consumer Protection Shield
Sensible Handgun Regulation in Massachusetts: A Paradigm for a National Model?, 7 B. U. PUB. INT. LJ. 59,
71-73 (1998) (discussing the Massachusetts efforts to regulate firearms from a consumer safety standpoint).
210. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 16.02-16.06 (1997).
211. Id.
212. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-15(a) (1993) (banning the sale offirearas composed of a die cast zinc alloy
with a melting point of fewer than 800 degrees Fahrenheit); 720 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-3(h) (West Supp.
2000) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.712(4) (West Supp. 2000) (following the Massachusetts example but
requiring a higher melting point of 1000 degrees Fahrenheit); S.C. CODE ANN. §23-31-180 (West 1999) (setting
the melting point test at 800 degrees Fahrenheit).
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3. Existing California Law
In California, a 1996 poll found sixty-seven percent of Californians in favor of
a ban on Saturday Night Specials.2"' In the last few years, more than thirty
California cities and counties have banned the weapons.21 4 In Sacramento, the city
council enacted such a ban after statistics showed that forty-six percent of handguns
confiscated by Sacramento police were Saturday Night Specials. 2 5 A recent study
in that city noted that three of the top five guns confiscated by Sacramento police
in 1995 were Saturday Night Specials manufactured by Ring of Fire companies.
216
Statistics in Sacramento also indicate that "nearly half' of these weapons were
carried by young adults and children.
2 7
In 1997 and 1998, the California Legislature heeded the citizens' call and made
efforts to ban Saturday Night Specials in the 1998 legislative session.2' 8 The bills
it passed banned handguns that did not meet size requirements, lacked safety
devices, failed a drop test, or failed an accuracy scoring test.2'9 However, former
Governor Wilson vetoed this legislation, apparently relying on the argument that
the law would deprive the poor of needed protection by banning the only firearms
they could afford.220
C. Chapter 248: Banning "Unsafe Handguns"
Only a year after Wilson's veto, a similar ban on Saturday Night Specials and
other inferior and unsafe handguns has passed into law. Chapter 248 calls for a
series of tests and standards that all models of handguns sold in California must
pass before being approved for sale in this State.2' Violation of Chapter 248 will
result in imprisonment for one year for each illegal handgun sold.= 2 Manufacturers
and dealers must show that the models they sell have passed tests conducted by an
independent laboratory.' The tests are similar to those imposed in Massachusetts
213. Mary Lynne Vellinga, Crime, Gun Control Offer Ammunition for '98 Races: Key in Contests for
Senate, Governor, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 1, 1998, at Al.
214. Bejar, supra note 209, at 75.
215. Tony Bizjak, Threat of Saturday Night Specials Stressed: They're 46% of Guns Seized by City Police,
Study Finds, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 17, 1997, at B1.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. SENATE RuLES COmmITEE, FLOORANALYSIS of SB 15, at 7 (Aug. 8, 1999).
219. Eg., SB 1500 (1998) (as introduced on Feb. 5, 1998, but not enacted); SB 500 (1997) (as introduced
on Feb. 20, 1997, but not enacted).
220. See SENATE RuLEs COMrIE, FLOOR ANALYSiS of SB 15, at 7-8 (Aug. 8, 1999) (quoting former
Governor Wilson as stating, "[Not only does SB 500 fail to keep guns out of the hands of criminals, it will
deprive law-abiding, legitimate gun users of the needed protection of handguns).
221. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12126, 12127(a) (enacted by Chapter 248).
222. Id. § 12125(a) (enacted by Chapter 248).
223. Id. § 12127(a) (enacted by Chapter 248).
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in that they include a drop test and a model firing qualification test of 600 rounds. 4
Chapter 248 also requires that handguns sold in California include a safety device
to prevent accidental discharge. A failure of any of these three tests will
disqualify a model for sale in California.
The role that the California Department of Justice will play under Chapter 248
is one of overseer. The Department will certify laboratories eligible for testing
firearm models, and will charge these laboratories a fee for the costs of this
certification.2 6 The Department will also maintain a roster of certified models that
are considered safe, again supported by a fee charged to manufacturers.227
Chapter 248 will not apply to all handguns sold in California, however. Certain
exemptions are granted for the sale of relics and curios." Chapter 248 allows
models that have not yet been certified to enter the State for the purposes of
certification by laboratories in California.229 Furthermore, the Legislature has
chosen to exempt from Chapter 248's purview handguns used by law enforcement
personnel.23
D. Analysis of Chapter 248
Chapter 248 is, simply stated, consumer protection legislation applied to
firearms.2' It is not gun regulation hiding behind the guise of consumer protection.
If this were so, then one would probably expect to see a regulation including a
melting point requirement, which would help law enforcement to track down
weapons used primarily by criminals. 2 Furthermore, Chapter 248 is not limited in
application to handguns that meet the description of Saturday Night Specials. The
new law will apply to all handguns, including the higher-quality ones? 3
The testing system imposed by Chapter 248 will require independent tests to
corroborate the claims made by manufacturers that their products are safeY24
224. Compare MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 16.02-16.06 (1997) (providing these drop tests and firing
tests), with CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12126, 12127, 12128 (enacted by Chapter 248) (same).
225. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12126(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 248).
226. Id. § 12130(b) (enacted by Chapter 248).
227. Id. § 12131(a)-(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 248).
228. Id. § 12125(b)(3) (enacted by Chapter 248); see 27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (1999) (defining the terms curio
and relic as essentially being antique firearms).
229. Id. § 12125(b)(1)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 248).
230. Id. § 12125(b)(4) (enacted by Chapter 248).
231. "Senate Bill 15 is a common sense, responsible gun law. It requires that weapons fire when they are
supposed to and that they not fire when dropped .... If a weapon is not reliable[,] ... it has no business being sold
in California." SENATE RULES COMMITEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 15, at 12 (Aug. 16, 1999).
232. See supra Part V.A.2 (discussing difficulties for law enforcement associated with Saturday Night
Specials and efforts to regulate these weapons).
233. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12125(a) (enacted by Chapter 248) ("[A]ny person in this state who
manufactures or causes to be manufactured, imports into the state for sale, keeps for sale, offers or exposes for
sale, gives, or lends any unsafe handgun" (emphasis added)).
234. CAL PENAL CODE § 12127(a) (enacted by Chapter 248).
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Finally, the gauntlet of three tests-a safety device, a drop test pass rating, and a
model firing qualification test-will ensure a basic standard for safety. 5 Guns
passing these tests should not discharge accidentally or explode unexpectedly after
continued use.
This legislation was not enacted solely for the purpose of eliminating a type of
firearm from criminals' arsenals. 6 It may have that effect, but it will also protect
legitimate owners and innocent bystanders from a product that may inadvertently
injure them.2 7 It is a serious law with a penalty of imprisonment for importing or
keeping for sale a Saturday Night Special,28 a penalty not as easily ignored as a
civil fine.
E. Conclusions on Chapter 248
Handguns are weapons that are designed to kill. This power needs to be treated
responsibly and carefully. By requiring a certain level of quality from these
firearms, Chapter 248 provides a measure of that safety.239 Gun owners must bear
the remainder of that responsibility by making sure that their weapons do not hurt
the innocent. Firearms need to be secured safely when not in use and should be used
only for proper purposes. Chapter 248 shoulders some of the burden of protecting
Californians by shielding gun owners against an unknown danger from the weapon
in their hands.
VI. CONCLUSION
California has seen its gun regulation expand in the most recent session of the
Legislature. New laws have been promulgated to address problems that have not
been met effectively or have never been addressed by previous administrations.
Chapter 129 strives to enact a comprehensive assault weapons ban for California,24
while Chapter 128 hopes to prevent criminals from using strawmen for one-time
arsenal shopping sprees.241 Chapter 248 promises safer guns for both gunowners
and the public by enacting safety provisions designed to ban Saturday Night
235. SENATE RULES COMMrrrm, FLOOR ANALYSIS of SB 15, at 3-4 (Aug. 16, 1999)
236. Cf. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 12125-12133 (enacted by Chapter 248) (providing safety regulations, but
having no prohibition on use by criminals).
237. See id. (enacting safety tests and standards to prevent accidental discharges and explosions).
238. Id. § 12125(a) (enacted by Chapter 248) (setting the punishment for violation as a misdemeanor with
imprisonment for up to a year in a county jail).
239. See supra Part V.C-D (discussing the safety standards and efficacy of those standards as found in
Chapter 248).
240. See supra Part M (discussing the provisions of Chapter 129 and its effect on the Robcrti.Roos Act,
California's assault weapons ban).
241. See supra Part IV (discussing the strawman purchase, a popular method used by criminals to acquire
large arsenals of weapons from legitimate dealers, and the provisions of Chapter 128 enacting a one-handgun-a-
month law preventing one-trip arsenal shopping).
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Specials.242 As with all newly enacted legislation, the success or failure of these
policies is not clearly foreseeable, but the laws clearly strengthen rules governing
firearms. Tragic accidents from defective firearms, and horrendous crimes
committed with assault weapons that serve no need in modem society, no longer
need occur.
242. See supra Part V (discussing the ever-present problem of Saturday Night Specials and Chapter 248's
ban on these cheap and dangerous handguns).

